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Whan that Aprille with his shooures soote
The droghte of March hath perced to the roote,
And bathed every veyne in swich licour
Of which vertu engendred is the floyr ....
GEOFFREY CHAUCER, THE CANTERBURY TALES (1386)
April is the cruellest month, breeding
Lilacs out of the dead land, mixing
Memory and desire, stirring
Dull roots with spring rain.
T.S. EuOT, THE WASTE LAND (1922)
I. INTRODUCTION
Farming is risky business. The greatest factor affecting agricultural
production-the weather-is an occupational hazard over which farmers
have no control. While in years past producers operated in a "hip
pocket" fashion, from "year to year on money and resources saved
from the previous year's operation,"' modem farms-highly leveraged
and highly specialized-often depend on the success of a single crop in
order to meet their debt obligations. When a natural disaster strikes, it
can "wreak financial ruin" on whole farm communities "in a matter of
days or even hours."2
When Congress passed the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980
(FCIA),3 its stated objective was to make crop insurance the nation's
primary means of agricultural disaster risk management. 4 Congress
envisioned a crop insurance regime used widely enough to displace the
pressure for ad hoc disaster relief, and sought to achieve this objective
by removing limits on the program's expansion and by subsidizing
premiums. Fifteen years later the FCIA had not met its goal. Despite
widespread eligibility, participation never approached the Act's goal of
1. 126 CoNG. R c. 2,737 (1980) (statement of Rep. Ed Jones).
2. Id.
3. Pub. L. No. 96-365, 94 Stat. 1312 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7
U.S.C.).
4. H.R. REp. No. 649,103d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CA.N. 2516, 2519.
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50%,5 and Congress soon found itself succumbing repeatedly to
pressures for direct cash relief.
The FCIA's failures, along with a rash of midwestern floods and
southeastern droughts, prompted Congress and the Clinton Administra-
tion to reexamine federal agricultural disaster assistance. 6 On March 2,
1994, former United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Secre-
tary Michael Espy proclaimed the need for a comprehensive reform of
the FCIA-one designed to "provide 'insurance coverage as certain as
disasters."' 7 Shortly thereafter, in April 1994, legislation was intro-
duced to eliminate the chronic lack of participation in the program, and
thereby mitigate the pressure for ad hoc disaster relief, by making
available to all farmers "free" catastrophic coverage against yield losses
of greater than 50%, for a nominal fee of $50 per crop per county.8
Sponsored by the Clinton Administration and introduced by Democratic
Representatives de la Garza, Tim Johnson, and David Minge, the legis-
lation also proposed to repeal then current legal authorities for ad hoc
disaster relief.9 Although other proposals ranged from greater subsidi-
zation of premiums, to complete privatization of the system, to the
simple establishment of a permanent reserve for disaster relief, in the end
it was the Administration's proposal, hailed as the Federal Crop Insur-
ance Reform Act of 1994, was adopted.10
Setting aside for the moment the specific merits and demerits of the
Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act (FCIRA), it is noteworthy that many
of the various proposals placed on the table in 1994 focused primarily
on the need for reforming the type of protection afforded farmers.11 To
5. See U.S. GEN. AccouwNmo OFFICE, CROP IMsuRANcE: FEDERAL PROGRAM HAS BEEN UNABLE TO
MEET O BmctvEs OF 1980 ACT 5 (GAO/T-RCED-93-12, Mar. 3, 1993) (statement of John W. Har-
mon, Director, Food and Agricultural Issues Resources, Community, and Economic Development
Division, United States General Accounting Office) [hereinafter GAO, 1980 ACT] ("The highest par-
ticipation rate-40 percent-was achieved only in 1989 and 1990, when participation was mandatory
for farmers who had received disaster payments during the previous year to be eligible for future
payments. After the requirement was lifted, however, participation immediately fell back to 33
percent."); see also H.R. RPa. No. 430, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1979).
6. H.R. REP. No. 649, supra note 4, at 43, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. at 2543.
7. Id. at 21, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2520 (quoting then-Secretary Espy).
8. See Richard Orr, House Bill Would Reform Federal Crop Insurance Plan, Cm. TmiB., May 2,
1994, at 3; Telephone Interview with Ralph Chite, Congressional Research Service (May 5, 1994).
9. Orr, supra note 8, at 3.
10. See Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-354, 108 Stat. 3178 (1994)
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1521).
11. See, e.g., U.S. GE. AccouNTING OFFCE, CROP I NSURAN E: PROGRAM H AS Nor FosTERmE SIG-
NImICANT RISK SHARING BY INSURANCE COMPANIES 16 (GAO/RCED-92-25, Jan. 13, 1992) [hereinafter
GAO, RISK SHARING]
(In a series of reports over the past 11 years, we have criticized FCIC's management for
(1) inaccurate price forecasting, (2) poor internal controls for creating new programs,
(3) insufficient control over the reinsured companies, particularly for loss adjustment, (4)
inadequate procedures to ensure accurate production guarantees, and (5) expanding the
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be sure, the need for particular reform was substantial, and to an extent
proposals for particular reform are in practice indistinguishable from
those calling for systemic reform. For instance, it is difficult, other than
conceptually, to separate the particular problem of low participation
from the systemic problem of the dual provision of crop insurance and
ad hoc relief. An examination of the censure typically leveled at the
past system, however, suggests that the greatest inadequacy of federal
crop insurance was not particular, but systemic.
The bulk of this criticism was directed at the Federal Crop Insurance
Corporation's inability to ensure widespread participation by offering
coverage that both flexibly and affordably met farmers' needs. As I
have noted, these needs differ markedly from producers' needs just
one-quarter of a century ago, when highly leveraged and highly special-
ized farms were less commonplace. Undoubtedly today's farmers'
needs differ as much from the needs of the next millennium's growers.
Hope, therefore, lay not simply in changing the types of protection
available, but in creating a system that could itself respond to changing
demands.
In this article I discuss whether the FCIRA creates such a system.
More importantly, however, I suggest principles to govern the choice of
future crop insurance proposals. 12 Specifically, federal crop insurance
should follow certain basic principles governing all types of economic
regulation. First, state intervention, both generally and in agriculture, is
most justified where the government undertakes to provide a "public
good," that is, a needed service that would otherwise be underpro-
vided.13 Second, where these needs go unmet as a result of individual
program too rapidly without taking sufficient measures to ensure its fiscal integrity. In
1983, 1985, and 1987, we criticized FCIC's standard reinsurance agreement for being
too generous to the reinsured companies. In addition, we have noted that the Congress'
provision of emergency loans and disaster payments has undercut FCIC's ability to
increase program participation. All of these factors ... have contributed to FCIC's bleak
financial condition.).
See generally COMMISSION FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE PROGRAM, RECOM-
MENDATIONS AND FINDINGS To IMPROVE THE FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE PROGRAM (1989) [hereinafter
USDA, RECOMMENDATIONS AND FNDINGS].
12. Some may agree with these principles, but not with the conclusions I draw from them. Others
may -agree with my policy conclusions, but quarrel with my assumptions. To this I can only respond
that I will be satisfied if my postulates fuel the debate over crop insurance reform. I might add,
however, that the principles I advance are flexible enough to accommodate a range of approaches.
That is, I intend them as broad principles, not as narrow prescriptions.
13. This is not to say that government involvement is only justified where the need would go
unmet, but only that the case for intervention is then strongest. Nor is it to say that state intervention is
always justified where this is the case. I take no position about the frequency with which such needs
arise. See generally RoY J. RUFFIN & PAUL R. GREGORY, PRNcIPLES OFECONOMICS 876 (3d ed. 1988)
(characterizing public goods as "another example of market failure because competitive markets will
fail to supply or will undersupply them").
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choices, and not due to variables beyond individual control, the state
should not intervene on behalf of those individuals.
The public role in helping farmers absorb production risks is
therefore quite narrow. Government intervention is justified to the
extent that commercial insurers are unable to provide protection against
natural risks beyond the control of individual producers. Moreover,
there is an inverse relationship between the extent of state intervention to
protect vulnerable producers and the justification for providing further
relief to producers who opt not to utilize government crop insurance
services in favor of a form of self insurance. These principles of "justi-
fied intervention," a form of "market failure" analysis, 14 provide a test
for measuring the wisdom of particular crop insurance reform proposals.
In Part II of this article, I briefly detail the history of federal crop
insurance and other agricultural disaster relief in the United States. In
Part III, I discuss long-term difficulties of the crop insurance program.
In Part IV, I analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the FCIRA, in
comparison to my own reform proposal, according to the principles of
justified intervention.
II. "PHASES OF HARDSHIP":I5 A BRIEF HISTORY OF FEDERAL
CROP INSURANCE
A. PIONEERING EFFORTS
Federal delivery of agricultural disaster assistance began when
Congress enacted the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1938 (FCIA)16 in
response to a prolonged period of severe drought.1 7 Private efforts to
provide multiperil crop insurance "failed because the companies had
inadequate data on how to set premiums, which caused them to set prices
too low." 1 8 Unable to absorb the financial hazards of offering all-risk
crop insurance, private insurers either abandoned or eschewed this
14. Cf. A. Michael Froomkin, Reinventing the Government Corporation, 1995 U. Ill. L. Rev. 543,
577 ("Congress often turns to [federal government corporations] when the mission, often viewed as
necessary to fill a gap in the private sector, is basically commercial.").
15. Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 383 (1947).
16. Federal Crop Insurance Act, ch. 30, 52 Stat. 72 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§
1501-1521).
17. See, e.g., JOHN STEINBEcK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH 1 (1939) ("To the red country and part of
the gray country of Oklahoma, the last rains came gently, and they did not cut the scarred earth....
The surface of the earth crusted, a thin hard crust, and as the sky became pale, so the earth became
pale, pink in the red country, and white in the gray country.").
18. GAO, RISK SHARING, supra note 11, at 10. For a general discussion of the reasons why private




market. 19 Consequently, "the Government engaged in crop insurance as
a pioneer." 20
The FCIA created the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC or
Corporation), a wholly government-owned agency, "to promote the
national welfare by improving the economic stability of agriculture
through a sound system of crop insurance." 2 1 Initially the coverage of
the FCIA was limited to wheat, but over time Congress amended the Act,
extending its scope to cotton in 1941,22 to flax in 1944, and to corn and
tobacco in 1945.23
The FCIA evolved not only with respect to the extent of crop
eligibility, but also in terms of the form of coverage.24 Originally, the
program sought to provide insurance "in kind"-the premiums, the
losses, and the FCIC's obligations were all determined on a bushel
basis 25 -in order to insulate farmers from price risks.26 Over time, this
approach evolved into an option-style "hedging operation" whereby
the farmer paid a cash premium equal to then current market rates,
which the Corporation would in turn use to buy wheat and cotton. 27 The
Corporation would then sell these same commodities and use the pro-
ceeds to pay indemnities owed farmers. 28 Stated simply, the FCIC
played the market, hoping to protect both itself and producers from
price swings that might occur between the time of purchase and the time
at which it sold commodities to pay indemnities.29
Not surprisingly, heavy losses plagued the early years of the pro-
gram, causing Congress to appropriate money solely for liquidation in
1943, and to suspend insurance entirely in 1944 and early 1945.30 A
wave of legislation beginning in late 1944, however, cautiously reactivat-
ed it.31 The initial round of this legislation provided for experimental
19. See Federal Crop Ins., Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Agric. Forest-
ry on S. 1397, 75th Cong. 1st Sess. 125, 185 (1937); H.R. REP. No. 1479, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937);
PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON CROP INS., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON CROP
INSURANCE, H.R. Doc. No. 150, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4, 11-12 (1937); 81 CONG. REc. 2866-67, 2887,
2891,2893,2895(1937).
20. Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380,383 n.1 (1947).
21. 7 U.S.C. § 1502 (1994); see also HR. REP. No. 430,96th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1979).
22. See Act of June 21, 1941, ch. 214,55 Stat. 255.
23. HR. REP. No. 430, supra note 21, at 26-27.
24. Id. at 27.
25. William H. Rowe & Leroy K. Smith, Crop Insurance, in THE YEARBOOK OF AGRICULTURE
1940: FARMERS IN A CHANGING WORLD 758-59 (Gove Hambridge ed., 1940).
26. HR. REP. No. 430, supra note 21, at 27.
27. Id.
28. Rowe & Smith, supra note 25, at 759 ("Thus it has been the policy to invest in wheat the
premiums received in cash equivalent and to pay losses by selling the wheat and giving the farmer a
check for the cash equivalent.").
29. H.R. REP. No. 430, supra note 21, at 27.
30. Id.
31. Id.; see also Act of Aug. 1, 1947, ch. 440, 61 Stat. 718 (reinstating crop insurance for all
1996]
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insurance on previously uncovered commodities, and legislation enacted
in 1948 placed the entire program on an experimental basis, restricting
the counties eligible for coverage, limiting increases in commodity
eligibility to three annually, and capping coverage at the amount of
producer investment. 32
Congress used this period of restricted eligibility to experiment with
other forms of insurance such as multiple crop coverage. 33 The 1947
amendments also authorized the FCIC to act as reinsurer, a provision not
utilized significantly 34 until passage of the Federal Crop Insurance Act
of 1980.35 In 1949, only two years later, the Act was again amended,
authorizing a period of further expansion into new counties.36
The FCIA underwent its next major revision in 1955, when Con-
gress authorized the use of premium income for the payment of the
direct cost of loss adjustment.37 Just one year later Congress further
extended this authority, allowing payment from the premium income of
a limited portion of administrative and operating expenses. 38 Unfortu-
nately, while Congress was authorizing further expenditures from premi-
um income, no measures were being taken to replenish those monies by
appropriations. 39 Instead, Congress, in following years and throughout
the 1970s, repeatedly authorized the issuance of additional capital stock
to cover producer claims, making it more and more difficult for the
FCIC to fulfill the Act's requirement that premiums be scheduled at a
rate "sufficient to cover claims for crop losses . . . and to establish as
expeditiously as possible a reasonable reserve against unforeseen
losses." 40 In catastrophic loss years, the FCIC relied heavily on these
capital stock subscriptions. 41
commodities).
32. HR. REP. No. 430, supra note 21, at 27.
33. Id. at 28.
34. Id. For a brief period between 1968 and 1972 the FCIC reinsured a portion of the Puerto
Rico Farm Insurance. Id. at 29.
35. See infra notes 52-69 and accompanying text.




40. Id. The substantive equivalent of this provision persists today. See 7 U.S.C. § 1508(d)(2)(A)
(1994). For a discussion of the related problem of crop loss valuation, see Mann v. Federal Crop Ins.
Corp., 710 F.2d 144, 146 (4th Cir. 1983) (discussing valuation of harvested peanuts "under a federal
crop insurance policy"), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984), and A.W.G. Farms, Inc. v. Federal Crop
Ins. Corp., 757 F.2d 720,728-29 (8th Cir. 1985) (stating that, where FCIC led Red River Valley sugar
beet farmers "down a primrose path, which would ultimately defeat their claim for indemnity," "basic
principles of good faith and fairness" suggested that processors need not outright reject beets from
farmers to invoke loss-determination method that applied to harvested beets not accepted under
processor's contract with growers).
41. HR. REP. No. 430, supra note 21, at 28.
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These problems, coupled with congressional wariness about expand-
ing the program's scope, had the unfortunate side effect of leaving a
substantial portion of United States agricultural production uncovered
by crop insurance.42 As of 1980, the FCIC offered coverage for only 30
crops in one-half of U.S. counties.43 Moreover, participation was low
even where coverage was available: only "about 10% of the eligible
crop acreage was insured in 1980-about 7% of total planted acre-
age ."44 This state of affairs caused Congress to rely on disaster assis-
tance and emergency loan programs as a means of protecting agriculture
from natural risks.45 During the years 1974 to 1980 alone, the USDA
paid an average of $436 million annually in direct cash payments to
farmers, in the form of ad hoc relief and emergency loans. 46 During the
period 1970 to 1979, the USDA averaged $965 million in emergency
loans.47 In short, a two-tier system had developed: crop insurance
availability remained limited, but the pressure for other forms of relief
remained strong.48
Meanwhile, structural changes in American agriculture had signifi-
cantly increased levels of risk and leverage among American farmers. 49
It therefore came as little surprise when Congress enacted the 1980
reforms to federal crop insurance on the eve of a farm credit crisis
already set in motion by the borrowing and marketing excesses of the
1970s.50 In summary, two types of problems hampered the effectiveness
of federal crop insurance: an actuarial problem arising from the FCIC's
use of premium income to cover a growing range of expenses; and a
participation problem due in part to limited eligibility and in part to the
availability of other forms of relief. Although forty years of amend-
ments had incrementally increased program eligibility, a "common
complaint" remained that the FCIA "never became more than a pilot
42. Id.
43. GAO, RISK SHARING, supra note l1, at 11.
44. Id.
45. Disaster relief and crop insurance remain practically related today. See generally Wilson v.
United States Dep't of Agric., 991 F.2d 1211, 1216 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that participation in disaster
relief program requires, like crop insurance, threshold showing that crop loss was caused by an
"'eligible disaster,"' i.e., not by "improper fanning techniques"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1296 (1994).
46. GAO, RIsK SHARIN, supranote l1,at 11.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See generally INoLo VooELE., THE MYTH OF THE FAmY FARM: AoRmUSINESS DOMINANCE OF
U.S. AGRICULTURE (1981) (discussing the changes from an agrarian populist's perspective); Jim Chen,
The American Ideology, 48 VAND. L. REV. 809, 824-30 (1995) (describing the changes, from a
"Consumerist's" perspective, as "The Decline of Agriculture as an Autonomous Enterprise").
50. See generally MARTY STRANGE, FAMIY FARMING: A NEw ECONOMIC VISION (1988) (discussing
agricultural industrialization and its effects on the family farm).
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program." 51 Congress set out to correct this situation at the end of the
1970s.
B. THE FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE ACT OF 1980
The difficulties and cost of operating this two-tiered system led
Congress to pass the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980. Hailed as a
"major overhaul," 52 this legislation, the basic structure of which remains
intact even after the 1994 Act, set out to achieve the following six
objectives: 53
* First, access and participation sufficient to eliminate the
need for ad hoc relief;
* Second, utilization of private sector expertise "to the
maximum extent possible" 54 in the risk-bearing, sales, and
servicing of federal crop insurance;
* Third, operation on an "actuarially sound basis" with
premium income sufficient both to cover claims and to
establish a reserve equal to 10% of premiums;
* Fourth, operation within a budget through better predict-
ion of program costs;
* Fifth, subsidization of premium costs to ensure afford-
ability for farmers; and
* Sixth, distribution of private insurance company risk
through federal reinsurance.
Many of these goals are related. Actuarial soundness nicely com-
plements the goal of operation within a budget, and federal reinsurance
plainly facilitates the effective solicitation and utilization of "the sales
talents and experience of private sector commissioned agents and
insurance companies."55 Most importantly, however, Congress under-
stood its chief goal, widespread participation, as directly related to
affordability. Congress determined that a premium subsidy would
achieve the desired effect. Accordingly, the Act provided, "[flor the
purpose of encouraging the broadest possible participation in the insur-
ance program," that 30% of each producer's premium would be paid
by the Corporation. 56
The goal of widespread participation is also integrally related to that
of actuarial soundness, defined by the Act as a program which sets rates
51. See H.R. REP. No. 649, supra note 4, at 19, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2518.
52. Id., reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2519.
53. GAO, RISK SHARING, supra note 11, at 12.
54. 7 U.S.C. § 1507(c) (1994).
55. HR. RP. No. 430, supra note 21, at 12-13.
56. 7 U.S.C. § 1508(b)(3) (1988) (amended 1994).
514 [VOL. 72:505
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at a level "sufficient to cover claims for losses on such insurance and to
establish as expeditiously as possible a reasonable reserve against unfore-
seen losses." 57 In terms of variable costs, actuarial soundness exists
where, in the long run, premiums cover the cost of indemnities. 58 In
simple terms, where an insurer has a large pool among which to spread
the risk of crop loss, the chances of doing so profitably are greater.
As of 1994, the FCIA had achieved just two of these six objectives:
increased commercial involvement and widespread access to crop insur-
ance. On the positive side, private sector participation did increase mark-
edly and, by then, commercial insurers in one form or another adminis-
tered the overwhelming majority of the program to the farm level. 59
Furthermore, between 1980 and 1990 the Corporation successfully
increased availability from 30 to 51 crops, and from 39 to 50 states. 60
The number of county program crops correspondingly expanded from
4,632 in 1980 to 21,373 in 1991.61 While eligibility had vastly expand-
ed, however, by 1994 "only about one-third of eligible acreage ha[d]
been enrolled."62 Participation rates varied significantly due to factors
such as fluctuating weather patterns, program promotion, education
efforts, and the particular crop insured. 63
The problem of low participation had several side effects, chief of
which was the Act's failure to achieve participation sufficient to elimi-
nate the political pressure for ad hoc disaster relief. By 1992, "the
federal government ha[d] . . . spent over $19 billion, or 76 % of total
disaster funds spent, in programs that [we]re alternatives to federal crop
insurance." 64 In addition to the roughly $6.2 billion outlayed for crop
insurance, the federal government also consumed $8.9 billion for
57. Id. § 1508(b)(l). This provision traces to the early years of the program. See supra text
accompanying note 40.
58. See ROBERT E. KEETON, BASIC TExT ON INSURANCE LAW § 8.4(a) (1971) (explaining:
Enlightened insurance rating is aimed at developing rates that are adequate and neither
excessive nor unfairly discriminatory. This threefold set of objectives is more often
stated, however, in twofold form-first, assuring that rates are adequate to provide funds
for paying losses, costs of administration, and reasonable profits and, second, assuring
that rates are neither excessive (with the result of unreasonable profits or costs) nor
unfairly discriminatory (with the result of unreasonably high rates to some policyholders
and unreasonably low rates to others).
(footnote omitted)).
59. See infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
60. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CROP INSURANCE: FEDERAL PROGRAM FACES INSURABILITY AND
DESIGN PROaLEMS II (GAO/RCED - 93-98, May 1993) [hereinafter GAO, CROP INSURANCE PROBLEMS].
For a discussion of the limits of eligibility, see Parks v. Federal Crop Ins. Corp., 416 F.2d 833, 838 (7th
Cir. 1969) (notwithstanding lack of ownership interest in the crop, tenant farmers who "bore a risk of
loss ... on their crops" had an "insurable interest" within the meaning of the FCIA).
61. GAO, RISK SHARIN, supra note 1l, at 17.
62. HR. REP. No. 649, supra note 4, at 20, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2519.
63. GAO, RISK SHARIO, supra note 11, at 20.
64. Id.
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disaster relief, and $10.1 billion in emergency loans, for a total of more
than $25 billion in disaster assistance during the 1980s. Unfortunately,
these numbers showed no sign of decreasing. 65 Between 1987 and 1994,
the federal government spent $16 billion in combined outlays for crop
insurance and ad hoc disaster relief-over $10 billion for disaster relief
and $6 billion for crop insurance.
As one might expect, the FCIA of 1980 also failed to achieve actu-
arial soundness, a fact attributable in part to-the rapid expansion of the
program, but also to low participation and the simple fact that the FCIC
charged insufficient premiums to cover indemnities. 66 As a result, the
program incurred losses in each year from its creation, though the
amounts varied by crop, region, and in cases of catastrophic losses .67
Finally, although the Act achieved its goal of involving the private
sector in the administration and profitability of the program, commercial
insurers had not, as. of 1994, assumed a commensurate level of risk and
responsibility for its failures, even where the privates participated as
reinsureds.68 Because private insurers would not likely offer multi-peril
coverage absent reinsurance, the FCIC provided it on more generous
terms than would a commercial reinsurer. 69 Although provisions of the
1990 Farm Bill attempted to cure this imbalance, they were largely
insufficient.
C. THE 1990 FARM BILL
The Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990 (the
1990 Farm Bill)70 left the structure of federal crop insurance largely in
place. It made a few noteworthy changes, only one of which is relevant
here: the attempt to shift a greater level of risk to reinsured companies
by modifying the standard reinsurance agreement.
Standard reinsurance agreements are the documents that govern the
relationship between the FCIC and reinsured companies offering crop
insurance under FCIA.71 Under the terms of the standard reinsurance
65. See id. (noting that programs costs have continued to increase).
66. See infra text accompanying notes 180-84.
67. GAO, RISK SHARING, supra note 11. at 25.
68. See generally GAO, RISK SHARINo, supra note 11.
69. See infra text accompanying notes 71-82.
70. See Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, 104 Stat.
3359 (1990) (codified as amended at scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
71. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 400.161-177 (1996) (discussing reinsurance agreements). The legal status
of the farmer under a direct contract is distinct. See Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Federal Crop Ins. Corp.,
947 F.2d 269,276 (7th Cir. 1991) ("The contracts Old Republic has with its farmer-insureds are 'total-
ly distinct and disconnected' from the contracts it has with the FCIC, its reinsurer.... [The reinsurer]
cannot involve the farmer-insureds in the liability determination because no privity exists between the
insureds and the FCIC." (citation omitted)). For a discussion of the differences between the FCIC
roles as direct insurer and reinsurer, see infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
516 [VOL. 72:505
FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE
agreements in effect during the 1980s, reinsured companies could pur-
chase "proportional" reinsurance through four distinct provisions-re-
spectively denominated assigned risk, quota share, surplus share, and
portfolio exchange-each containing its own ceding limits, thereby
separating their business into different risk categories and ceding to the
FCIC an amount inversely related to the degree of risk they elected to
assume.72 If, for example, a company ceded 75% of its business to the
FCIC as reinsurer, it would bear only the other 25% of indemnities on
claims.73 Correspondingly, the portion not ceded to the FCIC was eligi-
ble for "nonproportional" reinsurance (or, "stop-loss" reinsurance),
which further limited private losses. 74 In short, the standard reinsurance
agreements in effect in the 1980s allowed reinsured companies to share
proportionally in the gains while shifting a disproportionate risk of loss
to the FCIC75-to take the sweet without the bitter. In the words of
Representative George Miller, federal crop insurance was "a classic
program in which the profits [were] privatized and the losses we[re]
socialized." 76 Although this was due in part to the difficulty of "find-
ing the balancing point between the government's desire to leave as
much risk as possible to the private sector while providing the insurance
companies with sufficient incentive to participate in the program," 77 the
1990 Farm Bill nonetheless attempted to correct the problem.
The 1990 Farm Bill mandated a revision of the standard reinsurance
agreement to ensure that reinsured companies would take greater respon-
sibility for loss thereunder, while considering factors such as the avail-
72. GAO, RISK SHARING, supra note 11, at 26-27.
73. Id. at 27 n.l
(Under the 1986-89 standard reinsurance agreements' assigned-risk provisions,
companies might cede up to 95 percent of their premium and liability for losses for
designated policies (generally the highest risk policies) to FCIC. Quota share requires
companies to cede 5 percent of their remaining premium and liability for losses to FCIC.
Under the surplus share provision, companies designate an amount of premium and then
cede to FCIC 80 percent of all premium and associated liability above the designated
amount. Under portfolio exchange, companies with business concentrated in three or
fewer states may exchange a portion of their business with FCIC, thereby spreading the
companies' risk across all states where FCIC provides insurance.).
74. Id. at 27 ("For a negotiated fee, the reinsurance company agrees to reimburse the insurance
company for all indemnity payments above a predetermined amount. Stop-loss reinsurance protects
an insurance company from financial ruin if catastrophic losses occur.").
75. See generally id. at 26-37. These agreements are distinct from private reinsurance agree-
ments in several respects: First, FCIC makes available reinsurance for all crops, whereas private
reinsurers choose their markets; second, the concept of a standard reinsurance agreement is foreign to
private reinsurers, who operate on a case-by-case basis resulting in as many unique compromises
between the parties involved; third, both losses and profits are shared proportionally in private agree-
ments; and fourth, several factors resulting from the unique nature of environmental agricultural risks
make the FCIC's responsibility especially high.
76. 136 CoNG. REc. H5,613 (daily ed. July 25, 1990) (statement of Rep. George Miller).
77. GAO, RISK SHARING, supra note 11, at 47.
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ability of private reinsurance and the financial condition of the reinsured
companies. The FCIC responded by revising the standard reinsurance
agreement to require greater risk retention by reinsured companies and
to decrease the level of stop-loss insurance offered. The agreement
created three reinsurance funds-assigned risk (for the riskiest policies),
developmental (potentially profitable but not yet actuarially sound
policies), and commercial (the safest policies)-for different levels of
risk, while decreasing the ratio of potential gains to losses to reflect more
closely the companies' actual experience. 78
These changes represented an improvement, but private companies'
risk was still modest relative to that retained by the government. 79 Under
catastrophic loss scenarios, the 1992 standard reinsurance agreement left
up to 75% of potential losses on the shoulders of the FCIC.80 The
greater lesson, however, was that tinkering with the ratios and particulars
of the agreements is only effective to the extent that the underlying crop
insurance policy supporting them is sound and producer-responsive, as
"the agreement by itself cannot fundamentally alter the risk-sharing
relationship between the federal government and the private sector."8 1
When coupled with problems of poor correlation between FCIC pricing
policies and risks covered, as well as the effects of adverse selection and
moral hazard, discussed below, 82 transferring a commensurate level of
risk to the private sector proved a difficult proposition. In sum, where
the FCIC changed the 1992 standard reinsurance agreement, it changed
too little. Fundamental reform was necessary.
D. THE FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE REFORM ACT OF 1994
The Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994 (FCIRA or the
1994 Act) was hailed as such a reform, and in many respects it is. The
centerpiece of the Act is the "free" provision of catastrophic coverage
(CAT)-for an administrative fee of $50 per crop per county-against
yield losses of greater than 50%, indemnified at 60% of expected market
price.83 Lest the nominal fee prove insufficient to encourage participa-
tion, the FCIRA contained two other carrots to entice producers to
78. The agreement also required companies to retain 20% of the liability risk for assigned risk
policies, 35% for developmental policies, and between 50 and 100% for commercial policies. While
companies could only allocate 20% of their business to the assigned risk fund, there were no limits on
the amount of funds they could allocate to developmental and commercial funds.
79. GAO, RISK SHARwo, supra note 11, at 47.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See infra text accompanying notes 143-179.
83. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1508(b)(2)(a), 1508 (b)(5)(a) (1994). The FCIC fully subsidizes the premiums




purchase coverage. First, the FCIRA eliminates the legal authority for ad
hoc relief as to crops covered by federal insurance. The Act establishes
permanent authority for non-insured assistance payments (NAP) at levels
comparable to catastrophic coverage, whereunder 35% area and individ-
ual losses together trigger NAP relief for individual producers.84 Sec-
ond, the FCIRA conditioned eligibility for participation in other depart-
mental programs upon the purchase of at least catastrophic coverage.Ss
The collective emphasis of the 1994 Act is widespread enrollment in
CAT through heavy subsidization of premiums and the elimination of
unbudgeted disaster relief.
The 1994 Act also increases the range of additional (or, "buy-up")
coverage. Whereas previous policy permitted participating farmers to
elect yield guarantee levels of 50%, 65%, or a maximum of 75% of their
actual production history (APH)86 yield,8 7 present law authorizes cover-
age up to a maximum of 85% of individual yield or 95% of area yield.S8
Like previous policy, however, the FCIRA retains premium subsidies for
such coverage in hopes "of encouraging the broadest possible participa-
tion" in the program. 89
The 1994 Act resembles previous law in other respects as well.
Consider, for example, its declared objectives: "(1) to improve the crop
insurance program so as to protect farmers from crop losses caused by
natural disasters and (2) eliminate the need for ad hoc disaster assistance
legislation." 90 Like its predecessor, the FCIRA evinces a policy commit-
ment to crop insurance over ad hoc disaster relief, and seeks to achieve
its goal by making crop insurance affordable. As Kenneth Ackerman,
Manager of the FCIC, explained during the debate leading to the Act's
passage, "[clatastrophic coverage, the way we envision it, is basically a
replacement for a disaster payment."9 1 To be sure, the nominal fee,
coupled with the since-modified linkage of crop insurance with eligibili-
84. See 7 U.S.C. § 1519 (1994) (discussing non-insured crop disaster assistance).
85. Id. § 1508(b)(7)(A); 7 C.FR. § 400.656 (1996). The 1996 Farm Bill, however, eliminated this
"linkage" component of the 1994 Act in favor of a policy of permitting farmers to waive eligibility for
future disaster relief. See infra text accompanying notes 102-03.
86. See infra text accompanying notes 109-16 (discussing how the program operates in practice
and explaining the various provisions for calculating yields).
87. See 7 U.S.C.A. § 1508(a) (1988) (amended 1994) (prohibiting the Corporation from offering
"any level of coverage in excess of 75 per centum of the recorded or appraised average yield, as
adjusted").
88. 7 U.S.C. § 1508(c)(4) (1994).
89. Id. § 1508(e)(1).
90. H.R. REP. No. 649, supra note 4, at 17, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. at 2517.
91. Review of the Administration's Federal Crop Insurance Reform Proposal: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Env't, Credit, and Rural Dev. of the Comm. on Agric. House of Representatives, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1994) [hereinafter Reform Proposal] (statement of Kenneth Ackerman, Manager,
FCIC).
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ty for farm programs generally, make the 1994 Act more likely than its
predecessor to succeed in increasing participation. Still, it is interesting
that Congress remains committed to the basic premises of the FCIA of
1980. Likewise, although the FCIRA again pays lipservice to using the
private sector "to the maximum extent possible," 92 it actually more
closely resembles the pre-1980 "dual delivery" system of employing
both the public and private sectors to sell its services. In short, while the
1994 reforms substantially altered the types of coverage available to
farmers, it kept the underlying system and, in the case of delivery,
retreated from exclusive private sector sales.
Finally, the 1994 Act signaled certain changes in the way the FCIC
does business. As its "alternate" title-"The Department of Agricul-
ture Reorganization Act"-suggests, 93 the 1994 Act contemplates
substantial internal reorganization within USDA.94 Indeed, according to
President Clinton's statements upon its signing, the FCIRA "sets the
standard" for future proposals to "reinvent[ ] the Federal Govern-
ment." 95 Many of the Act's provisions are discretionary, however, and
the actual results of the ambitious plans to reorganize will have to be
worked out over time.96 Nonetheless, among the provisions relevant to
crop insurance are the authorization of the Secretary to establish the
Consolidated Farm Service Agency (CFSA),97 and the requirement that
he establish the Office of Risk Management and Cost-Benefit Analysis.98
The Act further authorizes the Secretary to assign to the CFSA the
general supervision of the FCIC,9 9 and-up until this May, when the
1996 Farm Bill worked further administrative reforms-the first signs
were that the primary changes wrought by the FCIRA were moving
forward. By Spring 1995, the FCIC and Agricultural Stabilization and
Conservation Service (ASCS) had already merged into the CFSA.100
92. Compare 7 U.S.C. §1507(c) (1988) with 7 U.S.C. §1506(c) (1994).
93. I say "alternate" because commentators tend to refer to the 1994 Act by one name or the
other, depending upon whether they are discussing its effects on crop insurance or on agriculture gen-
erally. The Act's complete title is "Federal Crop Insurance Reform and Department of Agriculture
Reorganization Act of 1994." Pub. L. No. 103-354, 108 Stat. 3178 (1994).
94. See 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-7014 (Supp. 1996) (codifying reorganization of Department of Agri-
culture).
95. Statement by President William J. Clinton upon signing H.R. 4217, 30 WEEKLY CoM. PRES.
Doc. 2005 (Oct. 17, 1994).
96. See generally Alan R. Malasky & William E. Penn, USDA Reorganization-Fact or Fiction?,
25 U. MEM. L. REv. 1161, 1165 (1995) (noting that the Act "contains more statements that 'the
Secretary is authorized' to do something than statements that the Secretary 'shall' do something").
97. 7 U.S.C. § 6932(a) (1994).
98. Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-127, § 194, 110
Stat. 888, 945-46 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6933).
99. See 7 U.S.C. § 6932(b)(2) (1994).
100. See Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Risk
Management and Specialty Crops of the Comm. on Agric. House of Representatives, 104th Cong., 1st
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E. THE 1996 FARM BILL
Just one full growing season after enactment of the FCIRA, Con-
gress enacted the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of
1996 (1996 Farm Bill).101 In the brief interim, however, some farm
groups expressed concern that making the acquisition of crop insurance
a "mandatory" prerequisite for participation in other farm programs
would discourage participation in both crop insurance and the other
programs. Accordingly, Congress traded in the mandatory linkage
component of the 1994 Act102 for a policy of permitting producers not
to purchase CAT provided they waive, in writing, their eligibility for any
future disaster payments. 103 Thus, there remains an added incentive to
purchase crop insurance, but farmers are free to self-insure while partici-
pating in farm programs generally.
The 1996 Farm Bill made other significant changes as well. First,
while it permits the USDA to continue offering CAT coverage directly in
states or regions that have an insufficient number of approved private
insurance providers, the 1996 Act requires the USDA to shift policies to
private companies when private coverage becomes "sufficiently avail-
able," as determined by the Secretary.1 04 This provision represents a
compromise between the advocates of dual delivery, who argued that
direct USDA delivery ensures widespread availability and coordination
between crop insurance and price support programs, and the advocates
of exclusively private delivery, who argued that a "single-point" deliv-
ery system would ensure maximum participation and "one-stop shop-
ping" for farmers, since buy-up coverage is only available privately and
those who purchase CAT coverage directly from the USDA might be less
likely to purchase additional coverage. 105 Second, the 1996 Farm Bill
establishes the Office of Risk Management (ORM).106 Whereas the 1994
Act subjected the FCIC to the jurisdiction of the CFSA, the 1996 Act
Sess. 12 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Risk Management Hearings] (statement of Grant B. Buntrock,
Acting Administrator, CFSA).
101. Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-127, 110 Stat. 888
(1996) (to be codified at various sections of 7 U.S.C.).
102. 7 U.S.C. § 1508(b)(7)(A) (1994); 7 CF.R. § 400.656 (1996).
103. § 193, 110 Stat. at 944 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1508(b)(7)(A)). See generally CONGRES-
SIONAL RESEARCH SERviCE, CRS REPORT F~oR CONGRESS,CROP INSURANCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT: PRO-
vISONS IN T HE ENACTED 1996 F ARM B L (Ralph M. Chite) (1996) [hereinafter 1996 CRS R EPORT] (on
file with author).
104. See § 193, 110 Stat. at 943 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1508(b)(4)(C)).
105. See 1996 CRS REPORT, supra note 103, at 3.
106. § 194, 110 Stat. at 945-96 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6933).
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places the FCIC under the authority of the ORM.107 The CFSA will
continue to oversee the operation of NAP.108
F. MECHANICS OF THE CURRENT REGIME
As the previous sections demonstrate, federal crop insurance has
experienced substantial changes in recent years. These broad policy
shifts make most sense when viewed in the context of the particular
provisions designed to carry them out. Indeed, as one government
report expressed the point: federal crop insurance is "relatively simple
in concept but highly complex in implementation."1 09 Thus, this
section explains the program as it now operates.
1. The Terms of Coverage
The terms of coverage are largely chosen by the participating
farmer. 110 In addition to catastrophic coverage, she may elect yield-guar-
antee coverage of up to 85% of her actual production history (APH)
yieldlll over the past 10 years, if relevant data are available, 112 and a
commodity price level ranging up to 100% of the crop's expected
market value.113 Naturally, premiums vary with the level of protection
and market price chosen, as well as other factors including the crop, the
107. Id.
108. The 1996 Farm Bill also instituted separate pilot programs for insect infestation, nursery
crop insurance coverage, futures and options trading, and revenue insurances. § 193, 110 Stat. at
944-45 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1508). It terminated the provisions that permanently authorized
assistance to livestock producers upon loss of a significant portion of their on-farm feed to a natural
disaster. Id.
109. U.S. GEN. AccoUNnNO OFRcE, CROP INsURANCE: ADDmONAL AcrToNs COULD FUTHER IM-
PROvE PROORAM's FINANciAL CONDrriON 12 (GAO/RCED-95-269, Sept. 28, 1995) [hereinafter GAO,
ADDrrONAL ACTIoNs].
110. See 7 C.F.R. § 401.3(b) (1996) ("At the time the application for insurance is made, the
applicant will elect an amount of insurance or a coverage level and price from among those contained
in the actuarial table for the crop year."). Of course, this is not to say that even the most sophisticated
farmers can easily comprehend the language of the regulations that govern their contract. Judge
Myron Bright, of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, has denounced federal
crop insurance regulations as representative of "the unfortunate tendency of some administrative
agencies to write in a form of bureaucratic language that is the antithesis of clear, succinct, and
understandable English." Citizens Bank v. Federal Crop Ins. Corp., 547 F.2d 59, 62 (8th Cir. 1976).
111. See 7 C.FR. § 400.52(b) (1996) ("Actual yield- The yield per acre for a crop year calcu-
lated from the production records or claims for indemnities. The actual yield is determined by dividing
total production (which includes harvested and appraised production) by planted acres for annual
crops or by insurable acres for perennial crops.").
112. Where such information is unavailable, the FCIC may assign the producer a substitute yield
level based on data that are not producer-specific. See 7 U.S.C. § 1508(g)(2)(B) (1994) (stating that,
absent satisfactory evidence of APH, "the producer shall be assigned a yield that is not less than 65
percent of the transitional yield of the producer"); see also id. § 1508(g)(2)(C) (stating that the FCIC
"may offer a crop insurance plan based on an area yield"); id. § 1508(c)(3) ("A producer shall have
the option of purchasing additional coverage based on an individual yield and loss basis or on an area
yield and loss basis, if both options are offered by the Corporation."); 7 C.F.R. § 400.52 (1996) (listing
definitions); GAO, CROP INsuRANcE PROBLEMS, supra note 60, at 19 (discussing yield estimates).
113. 7 U.S.C. § 1508(d)(2)(B) (1994).
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location of the farm, particular farming practices employed (such as
irrigation or non irrigation), and yield level. 114 Upon payment of a
claim, the insured receives a per-unit indemnity equal to the selected
market price multiplied by the number of bushels by which her yield fell
short of her chosen coverage level. 115 These terms are embodied in a
contract between the grower and a commercial insurer or, in the case of a
direct policy, the FCIC itself.11 6
An example is instructive: Suppose farmer Joe's 800-acre wheat
farm yields, on average, 100 bushels of wheat per acre. Further suppose
he chooses a 75% level of coverage at 90% of the projected market price
(which I shall stipulate to be $3.50/bushel). To the extent that Joe's
production falls below 75 bushels per acre, he qualifies for an indemnity
payment of that amount multiplied by 90% of the market price ($3.15).
If we further stipulate that Joe's production falls to 50% of his APH (to
50 bushels/ acre), we can conclude that he would receive payments of
$78.75/acre (25 bushels multiplied by $3.15), for a total of $63,000.
2. The Delivery System
One component of the 1980 Act that has become increasingly
important over time is the enrollment of the private sector in the sales,
service, and risk-sharing entailed in delivering federal crop insurance. 117
In order to facilitate this shift of responsibility, the 1980 FCIA provided
for the FCIC to set the prices and terms of insurance, to regulate the
private companies, to provide them administrative support, and, most
importantly, to reinsure them. 118 Initially, private companies were
invited to participate in two capacities: as "master marketers" and as
reinsured companies.119 Commercial insurers acting simply as agents or
brokers for the FCIC were known as master marketers. 120 Master mar-
114. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 401.8 (5.a.) (1996) (General Crop Insurance Policy) ("The annual pre-
mium is computed by multiplying the production guarantee times the price election, times the premium
rate, times the insured acreage, times your share at the time insurance attaches, and where applicable,
times any applicable, premium adjustment factor shown on the actuarial table."); see also 7 U.S.C. §
1508(d), (e) (1994) (discussing premiums).
115. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 401.101(7)(a) (1996) (Wheat endorsement) ("The indemnity will be
determined on each unit by: (1) Multiplying the insured acreage by the production guarantee; (2)
Subtracting therefrom the total production of wheat to be counted ... ; (3) Multiplying the remainder
by the price election; and (4) Multiplying this result by your share.").
116. See infra notes 117-36 and accompanying text. If "unavailable privately," additional cover-
age may be obtained directly from the FCIC. 7 U.S.C. § 1508(c)(l)(B) (1994).
117. See 7 U.S.C. § 1507(c) (1994).
118. Id. § 1508(e). The 1980 Act also provided for direct provision of insurance by the FCIC, as
it had in years past. See id. § 1508(a).
119. GAO, RIsK SHAmNG, supra note 11, at 13-14.
120. See, eg., 7 C.F.R. § 400.01 (1994) (discussing relationship between FCIC and private enti-
ties). Although one searches Title 7 of the Code of Federal Regulations in vain for hints of the phrase
"master marketing," the FCIC relied on § 400.201, which refers to "Sales and Service Contract[ors],"
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keters bore no risk on policies they marketed; the government both
retained the premiums and paid the indemnities on these policies.121
This was the more direct form of private marketing authorized by the
FCIC,122 and the terms of such policies were between the FCIC and the
farmer.123
The sale of reinsured policies, which is the only form of private
delivery remaining today, was distinct from master marketing.124 Private
companies sold, serviced, settled, and bore a degree of the risk of claims
against such policies. Their entitlement to reinsurance, embodied in the
standard reinsurance agreement discussed above, shifted a portion of the
gains and losses from these policies to the FCIC.125 Accordingly, what
distinguished master marketers from reinsured companies was not who
delivered the policy-in both cases commercial entities-but the relation-
ship between the private company and the government. In both cases,
the FCIC subsidized premiums and paid the administrative costs of the
program.1 26 Thus, from the farmer's point of view, the terms of the
policies were nearly identical. In the case of master marketing, however,
private companies selling the policies acted simply as administrative
conduits that bore no risk of loss; in the case of reinsured delivery,
private companies sold their own policies and bore risk on them. What
protected reinsured companies was the purchase of reinsurance from the
government.
Over time, the reinsurance provisions of the 1980 Act succeeded in
turning over to private companies an increasingly larger percentage of
the sales of multi-risk policies. Whereas reinsured companies sold only
about 3% of policy premiums in 1981, they accounted for nearly 89%
of such sales in 1990.127 These numbers continued to increase, causing
the FCIC to phase out master marketing entirely during the 1994 crop
season. 128 Thus, to the extent that private companies are currently
as an authorization for such arrangements. See id.
121. GAO, RIsK SHARING, supra note 11,at 13.
122. See 7 C.F.R. § 401.2(b) (1993) (noting alternate crop insurance methods).
123. See Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947) (finding that error of agent did
not bind FCIC, as it is not a private insurance company).
124. See supra note 121.
125. For an explanation of the standard reinsurance agreement as modified by 1990 Farm Bill
legislation, see supra notes 71-82 and accompanying text.
126. 7 U.S.C. § 1508(e) (1994).
127. GAO, RIsK SHARiNO, supra note 11, at 16-17. As discussed below, present law provides that
basic catastrophic coverage "may be offered by-(i) approved insurance providers, if available in an
area; and (ii) at the option of the Secretary that is based on considerations of need, local offices of the
Department." 7 U.S.C. § 1508(b)(4)(A) (1994). The same is roughly true for purchases of additional,
or "buy up." coverage. Id. § 1508(c)(1)(B).
128. Telephone conversation with Hayward Baker, Director. Reinsured Services Division, FCIC
(June 24, 1996).
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responsible for delivery of federal crop insurance, they assume that
responsibility as reinsureds, not as master marketers.
The private sector's dominance of sales notwithstanding, the FCIRA
retained a dual delivery system.129 In practice, however, the FCIRA can
only be described as a retreat from private delivery. Whereas reinsured
companies accounted for more than 90% of all crop insurance sales in
the early 1990s, they closed just 61% of such sales in 1995.130 Although
the government did not enter the market for buy-up coverage, it directly
delivered 68% of all CAT policies,131 which alone comprised 58% of
total sales. 132
As discussed above, however, the 1996 Farm Bill moved a step
closer to single delivery by requiring the use of approved private provid-
ers where "sufficiently available."1 33  Since the determination of
"sufficiently available" private insurance is left to the Secretary, it
remains to be seen what effect the 1996 changes will have. 134 Nonethe-
less, they represent at least a symbolic shift toward more responsive
delivery.135 Moreover, given past responses to seemingly symbolic shifts
129. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1508(b)(4)(i) (1994) (authorizing private sales of catastrophic coverage),
1508(b)(4)(ii) (authorizing direct USDA sales of catastrophic coverage "at the option of the Secretary
that is based on considerations of need"), 1508(c)(l)(B) (authorizing private sales of additional
coverage and, if "unavailable privately," by the USDA), 1508(k) (authorizing reinsurance of private
companies).
130. See FARM SERvicE AGENcy, FEDERAL CRoP INsuRANcCoRPORAoN: SUMMARY oB usINass
REPORT (June 24, 1996) (on file with author). In terms of raw numbers for 1995, reinsured companies
sold 1,242,447 policies whereas the government, through CFSA, sold 806,521 policies, for a total of
2,048,968 policies. Id.
131. In 1995, the CFSA sold 806,521 CAT policies, compared with 372,031 for reinsured com-
panies, for a total of 1,178,552 CAT policies. Id.
132. Id.
133. §193, 110 Stat. at 943 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1508(b)(4)(C)(ii)).
134. Id.
135. Given recent developments, perhaps banks soon will enter the business of selling crop
insurance. See 12 C.F.R. § 618.8040(b)(8) (1996)
(The banks may, only by agreement with an insurer, offer services traditionally furnish-
ed by insurers to the Farm Credit System. This shall include master marketers when
considering the sale of Federal crop insurance. The banks shall not underwrite insur-
ance, adjust claims payments or settlements. or train and school or service adjusters or
insurance agents.);
Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 116 S. Ct. 1103 (1996) (federal law permitting bank sales of insurance
preempts conflicting state law); Nationsbank of North Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins.
Co., 115 S. Ct. 810 (1995) (upholding as reasonable the determination of the Comptroller of Currency
that National Bank Act permits bank sales of annuities); see also Jonathan B. Cleveland, Comment,
Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company v. Clarke: A Second Look at National Bank Annuity Sales
and 12 U.S.C. § 92, 78 MINN. L. REv. 911, 930-42 (1994) (advocating broad power for banks to sell
insurance). Moreover, crop insurance is important to many agricultural bankers as a means of
protecting collateral on operating loans. See generally Reform Proposal, supra note 92, at 237-39
(statement of James F. Hart, President & CEO, Hand County State Bank, Miller, South Dakota, on
Behalf of the Independent Bankers Association of America).
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in policy, one might reasonably expect the Secretary to perceive its
congressional authorization as a mandate to rein in direct delivery.136
III. THE EYE OF THE STORM
The present system is not without its shortcomings, some of which
are unique to current law. Others, though, are seemingly perennial
limitations on the federal crop insurance program. What follows in this
section is an analysis of such long-term difficulties.
A. A PROBLEM NATIVE TO AGRICULTURE: THE NON-INDEPENDENCE OF
CROP Loss RISK
Crop insurance holders are insuring against bad weather. Like
other typically insured risks, weather is not something over which the
policy holder has control. Indeed, as then-Representative Leon Panetta
opined prior to passage of the 1980 Act, "[p]erhaps more than any
other profession, farming involves risks and uncertainties completely
beyond the control of the farmer. An entire season's work and invest-
ment can be washed away in a matter of days."' 137 Unlike other typical-
ly insured risks, however, weather typically strikes more than one policy
holder at a time. Many such weather-related or environmental hazards
can reduce crop yields over large regions of the country, and this bears
directly on the number of policies that will require indemnification in a
given year.138 In the 1988 drought, for example, 92% of the nearly
35,000 North Dakota and Montana wheat policies, as well as 58% of the
roughly 65,000 Minnesota, Iowa, and Illinois corn policies, required
indemnification. 139 Similarly, in the 1993 floods, the FCIC made pay-
ments on 72% of the approximately 71,000 Minnesota and Iowa corn
policies, and on 56% of nearly 55,000 soybean policies.140 In the crop
insurance office as in the field, the old and familiar adage, "When it
rains, it pours," holds true.
The widespread impact of environmental risks makes high partici-
pation particularly valuable for crop insurers. Actuarial soundness and
ultimate profitability depend upon the principle of risk pooling: the
136. Cf. Iowa ex rel. Miller v. Block, 771 F.2d 347,352 (8th Cir. 1985)
(It is not the business of this Court to order the Secretary to make payments under the
(Special Disaster Payments Program] to specific farmers. But when Congress has
created a program which contemplates that such payments will be made in appropriate
circumstances, it is the clear duty of the Secretary to promulgate regulations which carry
out the intent of Congress.).
137. 126 CONG. Rac. 2,741 (1980).
138. GAO, CROP INSURANCE PROBLEMS, supra note 60, at 15.




greater the pool of premium payers, the greater the effectiveness of
insurance. 141 A strong advantage thus accrues to a federal, or at least
national, crop insurance program, and this advantage increases with each
additional crop and region insured.
B. PROBLEMS DUE TO LACK OF INFORMATION
1. Mixing Apples and Oranges: The Problem of Adverse
Selection
One significant problem related to lack of accurate data is that of
adverse selection.142 When crop insurance premiums reflect average risk,
and not individual risk, high-risk farmers are more likely to find partici-
pation attractive simply because they are less likely to consider the premi-
ums-which are based on the farmer of average risk-too high for their
own level of risk. By contrast, low-risk farmers know their likelihood of
crop failure to be less, and thus are unwilling to pay a premium that
incorporates a level of risk higher than their own-even if it is simply the
average. Currently, actual production history (APH) average yields are
the primary basis relied upon in determining farm-level risk. Stated
simply, APH average yields are a producer's mean level of production
over the last ten years. Unfortunately, current methods of computing
these yields often "yield" inaccurate results.143
At least two limitations upon current methods of computing APH
average yields contribute to this phenomenon. First, APH computations
do not sufficiently reflect yield variability. Suppose, for example, that
both farmer Joe and farmer Jane have an APH average yield of 100
bushels per acre for the past ten years. But further suppose that while
Jane has harvested exactly 100 bushels per acre during each of these
years, Joe's yields during the same period have varied widely, such that
one year he harvested 50 bushels per acre, the next 150 bushels per acre,
and so on. Although it is clear from the statistics that there is a far
greater risk that Joe will have an exceptionally bad (or good) year, even
wild fluctuations such as these are left unfactored into Joe's APH aver-
141. See KEaTON, supra note 58, § 1.2(b)(2) ("Like other concepts based on probability, the con-
cept of risk is a rational device for managing ignorance. So too is insurance, since it is founded on the
concept of risk." (footnotes omitted)).
142. See id. § 1.2(b)(7)
(Whenever a large group of potential insureds are treated alike irrespective of some
factor that differentiates them as insurance risks, a disproportionately high percentage of
applications for such insurance tends to come from the less desirable applicants because
they get the better bargain. This is the principle of adverse selection.).
143. For an in-depth economic analysis of this problem, see Jerry R. Skees & Michael R. Reed,
Rate Making for Farm-Level Crop Insurance: Implications for Adverse Selection, 68 AM. J. AGRIc.
ECON. 653 (1986).
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age yield, and thus have no bearing on his premium. The effect is that
bad yields must be covered and are not offset with gains from good
yields-a losing proposition for the insurer.
Many producers, in contrast, criticize current computation methods
as unfair precisely because they do incorporate a farmer's bad years.
For them the suggestion that rates should incorporate yield variability,
for example, would only worsen their coverage, for they perceive their
bad years as unrelated to their own performance. In the words of
Representative Richard Ray, one problem is that "it is unfair to include a
producer's yields in good and bad years to get an average yield on
which to base the insurance payments." 144 This complaint, of course, is
a problem endemic to the operation of an actuarially sound crop insur-
ance program.
Second, APH average yield computations do not adequately ac-
count for trends in production. To continue the example, recall that in
the relevant ten-year period Farmer Jane maintained a consistent yield of
100 bushels per acre. But suppose that Farmer Joe, rather than produc-
ing wildly variant yields, initially produces a modest 55 bushels per acre,
but annually increases his yield by 10 bushels per acre, such that his
production in the final year assessed is 145 bushels per acre. Both
farmer Jane and farmer Joe have APH average yields of 100 bushels per
acre, and Jane is likely to produce that amount. But unless there is a
severe break in the pattern, farmer Joe is likely to produce a yield
significantly greater than 100 bushels per acre. Yet current FCIC
methodology does not account for trends. Consequently, farmer Joe will
think twice before insuring. If the yield he really expects is greater than
100 bushels per acre, he will have to incur significant losses to begin
receiving payments, even if he insures at or above the 75% level.
The statistics given are highly unrealistic, of course. Most farmers'
yields increase over time, unlike Jane's, and never are they perfectly
stable. Indeed, one wonders why farmer Jane would even consider
purchasing crop insurance, given the rare stability of her production.
Still, the examples illustrate the point that basing rates on an average
yield over a period of years may be a highly inaccurate method of
incorporating risk into the rate, depending on the current patterns of
yield variability and other production trends. When coupled with the
fact that producers are often unable to provide ten years of data145
(which necessitates the use of substitute data),146 the failure to account
144. Federal Crop Insurance Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Agricul-
ture of the Comm. on Small Business House of Representatives, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1988).
145. The practice of crop rotation frequently exacerbates this problem.
146. See supra note 112.
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for yield variability and production trends has a significant impact on
FCIC's accuracy in assessing risk. 147
2. Moral Hazard
A related but distinct problem in the administration of a sound crop
insurance program is that of moral hazard. In the crop insurance
context, moral hazard is the susceptibility of actual yields to the influ-
ence of producer actions. 148 As a result of the nature of these actions (or
inactions), it may be extremely difficult for the insurer to isolate the
cause of a farmer's crop loss. For example, a given crop loss may be
due to infestation of a certain insect, but perhaps this infestation is
equally attributable to the producer's failure to apply pesticides. Or a
crop failure might be characterized as the result of either drought or the
farmer's improper irrigation practices. What makes the hazard a "mor-
al" one is the element of voluntariness attributed to farmer action
causing the loss. A crop might truly have failed due to the weather, but
at times it is hard to deny the possibility that it might have resulted from
risks taken with the knowledge that a safety net of insurance would break
the fall.
One scholar, Ivor Elrifi, has criticized this assumption about pro-
ducer behavior as "morally unacceptable and offensive in contemporary
society,"149 but it seems far more absurd to suggest that crop insurance
purchasers are in this regard different from other insureds. Insurance
typically influences risk-taking behavior-an effect which, in a well-func-
tioning system, is incorporated into the rate-making process. Consider
the case of a farmer faced with the choice of whether to plant on a tract
of marginal land. In a no-insurance world, the farmer will bear any loss
147. The FCIC has recently instituted a Nonstandard Classification System (NCS) to target high-
risk participants. GAO, ADDITIONAL AcrTONS, supra note 109, 44-45. These efforts, also known as the
"high-risk" and "modified high-risk" programs, identify farmers with substantial claims in order to
increase their premiums and/or reduce the production levels they are permitted to insure. Id. Pro-
ducers who (i) "have received claims payments in at least three years," or, if data for more than five
years are available, in 60% of those years; (ii) have a cumulative adjusted loss ratio (claims to
premiums paid) of 4.0 or more; and (iii) "require a rate increase of at least 10 percent from the pre-
vious year," are placed in the high-risk program. Id. The modified high-risk program is identical
except that it targets farmers with adjusted loss ratios between 2.25 and 4.0. Id. Available data
suggest that these programs have resulted in some savings for USDA, although less than half as much
as USDA had predicted. Id. Unfortunately, the NCS does not account for the specific problems
discussed here, and it is limited in scope. See GAO, CROP INSURANCE PROBLEMS, supra note 60, at 25
(discussing NCS).
148. In insurance literature generally, moral hazard is defined as the increased probability of
loss caused where an insured has less incentive to take loss-preventive measures. For a more
thorough analysis, see, for example, A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTON TO LAW AND ECONOMICS
53-56 (1983).
149. Ivor Elrifi, A Comparison of Crop Insurance in the United States and Canada, 13 J. AGRIC.
TAX'N & L. 99, 100-101 (1991).
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incurred as a result of that tract's failure. She will thus think twice
before planting. But where a farmer can expect assistance upon its
failure, she stands only to gain by planting. Whether the tract produces a
good yield or fails is no longer relevant; she bears the loss only to the
extent of her premium.
Perhaps it is "'agriculturally incorrect"' 150 to say that moral
hazard is consistent with human nature, 151 but one need not rely on
speculation to support her claim that the problem plagues the federal
crop insurance system. Recent data indicate that moral hazard is a large
contributor to the FCIC's history of losses. The results of one study, for
example, suggest it may be responsible for up to 20% of yield losses for
crops such as wheat and sorghum, 152 and common sense suggests that
these empirical data are only likely to grow as other crops are studied.
In a similar vein, a General Accounting Office (GAO) report recently
noted that during the years 1981 to 1989, about 6% of crop insurance
policies reaped 28% of the total claims paid.153 As Professor Jim Chen
has stated in rejoinder to Elrifi: "The inexorable proclivity of all
insurance markets to cluster into two pools, an expensive one filled with
high-risk insureds and a cheap one filled with their low-risk counterparts,
firmly proves the existence of the 'moral hazard' problem that Elrifi
urges policymakers to ignore."154
The federal crop insurance program does not completely ignore the
problem of moral hazard. To an extent, the system contains a built-in
safeguard against abuse, in that coverage extends only to losses caused
by "drought, flood, or other natural disaster,"155 not to those due to
"the neglect or malfeasance of the producer,"1 56 the "failure ...to
reseed" when "customary,"157 or "the failure .. .to follow good farm-
ing practices . . . ."158 In the words of Judge Edith Hollan Jones, federal
crop insurance "insure[s] against acts of God and nature but expressly
disclaim[s] any liability for losses attributable to man." 159
150. Chen, supra note 49, at 811.
151. Perhaps agriculture reflects tendencies of human nature more than other insurable human
activities. Cf. Jim Chen, Of Agriculture's First Disobedience and Its Fruit, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1261,
1262 (1995) ("As the most palpable link between humanity and nature, agriculture often acts as a
stark mirror of human values.").
152. See GAO, ADDITIONAL ACTIONS, supra note 109, at 43.
153. Id.
154. Jim CHEN, AGRICULTURAL PUBLIC LAW 319 (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
155. 7 U.S.C. § 1508(a)(1) (1994).
156. Id. § 1508(a)(3)(A).
157. Id. § 1508(a)(3)(B).
158. Id. § 1508(a)(3)(C).




Determining whether a farmer has used "good farming practices"
often involves close evidentiary questions. Consider the case of Bartmess
v. Federal Crop Insurance Corp.,160 in which George Bartmess and his
wife, Helen, Louisiana rice farmers, sought to recover losses arising out
of flood damage to their crop.161 When the FCIC denied coverage on
the basis that Bartmess, by planting into flood waters, triggered the
policy's exclusion for failure to follow good farming practices, Bartmess
sued and introduced substantial testimony-that of his son, a field hand,
a neighboring farmer, and a local bank vice president who also served as
president of the local levee board-that, although his planting was
delayed by earlier rains, his field was not actually inundated by the flood
until after the rice had been planted.162
The FCIC, by contrast, introduced a hydraulic engineer's "educat-
ed guess" that, based on gauge readings taken along the local Red River
and Bartmess's levee, the flood waters would have "overtopped"
Bartmess's field prior to his completion of planting.1 63 Bartmess, the
levee board president, and a geologist all testified in reply that, according
to their predictions, it would have taken ten days to three weeks for that
to happen-an estimate the engineer admitted was consistent with his
conclusion--sufficient time for Bartmess to finish seeding his crop. 164
An FCIC exhibit, however, indicated that, were Bartmess's estimate to be
credited, flood waters still would have overtopped his levee before he
completed planting.165 The FCIC also introduced evidence that Bartmess
had switched to a cheaper seed midway through planting, but that he had
denied as much when first interviewed by the claims adjuster.166
The district court concluded that Bartmess failed to carry his burden
of proving that his crop failure was an "unavoidable loss of produc-
tion," reasoning that Bartmess planted his crop after he knew, or should
have known, it was "a vain endeavor."1 67 The Fifth Circuit affirmed,
noting that "[t]he district court was not bound to believe the FCIC
witnesses," since "the evidence supporting Bartmess's claim was am-
ple."168 Instead, the court acknowledged, the district court "might well
have credited the argument that Bartmess could not have anticipated
160. 845 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1988).
161. Bartmess v. Federal Crop Ins. Corp., 845 F.2d 1258, 1259 (5th Cir. 1988).
162. Id. at 1259-60.
163. Id. at 1261.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Bartmess, 845 F.2d at 1261-62. Given the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that the case turned on
the credibility of the testimony, one may reasonably surmise that this fact was central to the district
court's findings.
167. Id. at 1262.
168. Id.
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being flooded because the flood waters eventually topped his levee by
only inches, and because Bartmess had testified that, when he finished
planting, the waters were 2 1/2 feet below the top of the levees," or "the
argument that, had the rise been only slightly less, the levees would have
held, and the crop would have been harvested."169 As an appellate
court, however, it "read only typed words on a cold, white page," and it
was therefore inappropriate to re-strike the "balance of proof' by
"counting witnesses or weighing words." 170 The FCIC thus "emerged"
the victor, leaving Bartmess with only a field of spoils. 171
Notwithstanding FCIC attempts at enforcing the "good farming
practices" provisions, the difficulty of monitoring individual farmers'
practices and isolating specific causes of crop loss persists. Farmers
make all sorts of discrete, even imperceptible decisions that increase or
decrease their risks.172 Indeed, the same study to suggest that moral
hazard is responsible for so great a part of current losses also concluded
that monitoring difficulties may preclude the possibility of eliminating
it.173 Current FCIC methods have by and large been unsuccessful in
detecting moral hazard, and the costs of acquiring these data, if their
acquisition is feasible, may outweigh the gains in loss prevention.
This is not to say moral hazard is an entirely intractable problem,
however, for the present regime fails even to encourage loss-prevention.
Farmers who take such measures pay the same premiums as those who
fail to do so, and, notwithstanding recent FCIC efforts to identify
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. This is the typical outcome. In fact, I found no federal case reporting a finding for the
producer that was allowed to stand. See, e.g., Wilson v. United States Dep't of Agric., 991 F.2d 1211,
1215 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding sufficient evidence in administrative record to uphold ASCS's determin-
ation that plaintiff's rice farming practices were improper, notwithstanding testimony of six local
farmers, where Extension Service materials indicated that rice properly cared for should have grown
faster than plaintiff's); R & R Farm Enters., Inc. v. Federal Crop Ins. Corp., 788 F.2d 1148, 1151 (5th
Cir. 1986) (vacating holding for producer where district court failed to place upon it the burden of
proof "to show that, for that portion of its loss for which it seeks indemnification, the loss was directly
caused by one or more of the perils insured against"); Berry v. United States Dep't of Agric., 766 F.2d
886, 890 (5th Cir. 1985) (notwithstanding producer's testimony that harvesting was impossible after
certain date, neighboring farmer's and FCIC adjuster's testimony that area land was harvestable until
later date supported finding that producer did not suffer "unavoidable loss of production"); Hill v.
Federal Crop Ins. Corp., 669 F. Supp. 928, 929 (E.D. Ark. 1987) (finding that, given "windy and dry
conditions after Plaintiffs planted, recognized good farming practices would have caused Plaintiffs to
flush the rice fields at issue to provide necessary moisture" and "to replant"); Royalty v. Federal Crop
Ins. Corp., 618 F. Supp. 650, 652 (W.D. Ky. 1985) (denying coverage for failure to follow good
farming practices where an otherwise "competent farmer ... simply strained his capabilities to the
breaking point" by leaving "insufficient time to prepare the land and to plant the crop properly," given
the "rainy spring"); see also Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Hester, 765 F.2d 723, 728 (8th Cir. 1985)
(upholding, in False Claims Act case, admission of neighboring farmers' testimonial estimates of
defendant's probable yield where they "had for years grown corn ... on similar land").
172. See supra the text accompanying note 148.
173. See GAO, CROP INSURANCE PROBLEMS, supra note 60, at 23.
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high-risk purchasers-which, incidentally, only target farmers "known
to represent extreme risks" 174-even the riskiest farmers remain "enti-
tled" to federal crop insurance. 175 Furthermore, not all methods of crop
loss prevention are difficult to monitor. A grower susceptible to
drought, for example, might plant special drought-resistant strains, and
an examination of the damaged crop will reveal whether he did. Al-
though this is a simple example, it illustrates the untapped potential for
reform.
In summary, both adverse selection and moral hazard are character-
izable as problems of inadequate information. Adverse selection results
from too little data on the differences in risk among farmers; moral
hazard results from insufficient information due to the difficulties of
isolating the specific causes of a given crop's failure. 176 Adjustments to
the current system can decrease the effects of both, though at some point
the costs of these monitoring adjustments, particularly for moral hazard,
may offset the resultant savings.1 77 Notwithstanding the limits of our
"cost-benefit state," 178 however, such possibilities must be considered.
C. WORKING AT CROSS-PURPOSES
1. Achieving Competing Goals of Widespread Participation
and Actuarial Soundness
The success of federal crop insurance has also been hampered by
certain internal inconsistencies. Consider, for example, the competing
goals of widespread participation and actuarial soundness. At first
glance, these objectives appear complementary. As noted earlier, there is
a direct correlation between participation and the likelihood of achieving
actuarial soundness and ultimate profitability. As the Clinton Adminis-
tration has aptly expressed the point: "The more farmers buy higher
levels of coverage, the more fiscally sound the system will be."179
This analysis is incomplete as applied to the U.S. crop insurance
regime, however, which seeks to achieve widespread participation
through the subsidization of premiums. Indeed, the subsection of
174. Id. at 25.
175. Although the FCIC recently has begun tying crop insurance premiums to risk through its
NCS, its efforts remain modest. See GAO, ADDmONAL ACTONS, supra note 109, at 43 (discussing NCS
system).
176. To an extent, moral hazard involves insufficient data of both types. Yield variability, for
example, may result from a particular farmer's growing practices.
177. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977); R. H. Coase,
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 JL. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
178. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit
State, 48 STAN. L. Rav. 247 (1996).
179. HR. RE. No. 649, supra note 4, at 50, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CA.N. at 2550.
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current law that establishes the actuarial "soundness" requirements of
the federal crop insurance program also contains two subsections setting
forth the program's "projected loss ratio." 18 0 According to a GAO
study published prior to the 1994 Act, four elements of federal crop
insurance policy designed to increase participation have the side-effect
of inhibiting actuarial soundness: farmers' entitlement to purchase crop
insurance regardless of their risk; the use of assigned yields at the
farmer's option for determining normal crop production; legislative
limits on rate increases; and late sales closing dates, which allow farmers
to assess growing conditions before deciding whether to buy insur-
ance. 181 These provisions undoubtedly increase participation, but at the
expense of operating within a budget. Unfortunately, as a more recent
GAO study verifies, each remains more or less intact today.182 In order
to achieve its goal of profitability, or at least its goal of reducing its
expected loss ratio to 1.1,183 the FCIC will have to establish insurance
rates commensurate with risk. To the present date, anyway, participation
has taken precedence over profitability. Thus, what appear to be mutual-
ly reinforcing goals have in practice worked against each other.
2. The Philosophical Conflict Between Crop Insurance and
Ad Hoc Disaster Relief
A second way in which the federal disaster assistance strategy has
operated in an internally inconsistent manner is a result of Congress'
historic tendency to provide both crop insurance and ad hoc disaster
relief. From 1988 to 1994, the federal government funded an annual
average of $1.5 billion in unbudgeted disaster payments. In 1993 alone,
the amount exceeded $2 billion. Meanwhile, the federal government's
crop insurance program continued to pay nearly 1.5 times as many
indemnities as it received in premiums,1 84 and between 1981 and 1994
180. See 7 U.S.C. § 1506(o)(1)-(2) (1994).
181. GAO, CROP INsuRANcE PROBLEMS, supra note 60, at 30-34.
182. GAO, ADDITIONAL ACTIONS, supra note 109, at 20.
183. The 1994 Act required federal crop insurance to achieve, by October 1, 1995, an overall
projected loss ratio of not greater than 1.1. 7 U.S.C. § 1506(o)(1) (1994). The Act further requires
that ratio to be reduced to 1.075 by October 1, 1998. Id. § 1506(o)(2).
184. See GAO, ADDITONAL ACTIONS, supra note 110, at 17
([T]he claims paid per $1 of premium (including the government's subsidy) for crop
years 1981 through 1994 varied greatly from year to year, averaging $1.41. During this
period, claims exceeded premiums by a total of $3.3 billion. The highest claims
payments in relation to premiums were in 3 catastrophic years-resulting from severe
droughts in 1983 and 1988 and excessive moisture and severe flooding in 1993.
Excluding the 3 catastrophic years, the average claim per dollar in premiums was $1.22.
Thus, even in years without catastrophic losses, the program consistently operated at a
loss; catastrophic years just made the situation worse. (emphasis added));
see also Orr, supra note 8, at 3.
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losses exceeded claims by $3.3 billion. As discussed below, there is
plainly a relationship between the two programs' losses.
At the root of the government's unplanned budgetary outlays lay
chronically low participation in the crop insurance program. Although a
USDA study reports that only a nominal 4% of farmers attribute their
nonparticipation primarily to the prospect of ad hoc disaster relief, 18 5 a
significantly higher proportion, about 37%, cite the prospect as a sec-
ondary reason for not enrolling. 8 6 According to crop insurance indus-
try executives, farmers historically have believed that, if conditions get
"really bad," Congress will come to their aid.187 Accordingly, as of
1994, Congress had not yet succeeded in achieving a level of participa-
tion in crop insurance sufficient to ward off political pressure for ad hoc
relief.188 Thus, it came as little surprise when, at the various field hear-
ings held prior to the 1994 Act, there was "unanimous agreement" that
federal crop insurance and disaster relief, "two programs purportedly
working side-by-side to help producers, [we]re in actuality working at
cross purposes." 189 Insofar as the FCIRA repeals the legal authority for
ad hoc disaster relief, it represents a major step toward eliminating this
"inherent conflict in the program." 190 The real test of congressional
determination, however, will come with the country's next natural
disaster of catastrophic proportions. Then, and only then, will it be clear
whether Congress has abandoned this internal conflict for good.
D. POOR PARTICIPATION AND POOR COVERAGE CHOICES
A final factor contributing to the historically low level of participa-
tion in the crop insurance program is the lack of coverage options.
Indeed, the same USDA study to conclude that the availability of ad hoc
disaster relief has discouraged participation also found that the principal
reason for low enrollment-cited by 24.8% of those surveyed as the
most important factor in their decision-was the lack of sufficient
protection against the particular risks they commonly faced. 191 When
considered in light of the fact that 23% of those surveyed-the
third-highest response-choose not to participate primarily because they
prefer to absorb the risks attending self-insurance, 192 this demonstrates
that roughly one-third of all producers who would otherwise consider
185. USDA, RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINDINGS, supra note 11, at 57.
186. GAO, CROP INSuRANcE PROBLEMS, supra note 60, at 36.
187. Id.
188. See CHEN, supra note 154, at 319.
189. H.R. REP. No. 649, supra note 4, at 40, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2540.
190. GAO, ADDmoNAL ACTION, supra note 109, at 21.
191. USDA, REcOMMENATIONS Am FNDINos, supra note 11, at 57.
192. Id.
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buying crop insurance choose not to do so because coverage options are
insufficient. Even these figures may understate the significance of
insufficient coverage, as the second-rated reason for nonparticipat
ion-cited by 23.3%-was that the premiums are too high.193 One inter-
pretation of these data is that the premiums are too high for what farmers
get in return. Thus, it might be said that this group, too, chooses not to
enroll due to lack of sufficient coverage. If so, the implications are that,
of those farmers who would prefer to buy insurance, 62% elect self-insur-
ance because sufficient coverage is unavailable.194 Regardless of one's
characterization of the data, however, these figures are simply too large
to ignore.
Although reinsured companies are free to suggest alternative
coverage arrangements, these arrangements are subject to FCIC approval
and, historically, the Corporation has been reluctant to authorize them.195
As a result, many farmers criticize the program for not offering coverage
levels high enough to justify payment of the premium.
IV. PRAYERS FOR RELIEF
A. THE THRESHOLD QUESTION: Is GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN
DISASTER ASSISTANCE JUSTIFIED?
In 1978, on the eve of the congressional debate that led to the 1980
crop insurance reforms, then-Secretary of Agriculture Robert Bergland
stated that, "Unquestionably, the government must protect farmers
against natural disasters. Consequently, the policy choice precludes
consideration of anything other than the type of response we will
have." 196 Like many politicians, Bergland stated unequivocally what is
subject to serious debate. Historically, an overwhelming majority of
farmers have self-insured, and in a survey conducted as recently as 1989,
23% of farmers expressed a preference for self-insurance regardless of
193. Id.
194. I arrived at this figure by adding the percentages of the top two stated reasons for not
enrolling (24.8 + 23.3) and dividing the sum by the total percentage of persons who are willing to
consider buying insurance (100 - 23).
195. But cf. 7 U.S.C. § 1508(e)(3) (1994)
(If an approved insurance provider determines that the provider may provide insurance
more efficiently than the expense reimbursement amount established by the Corporation,
the approved insurance provider may reduce, subject to the approval of the Corporation,
the premium charged the insured by an amount corresponding to the efficiency. The
approved insurance provider shall apply to the Corporation for authority to reduce the
premium before making such a reduction, and the reduction shall be subject to the rules,
limitations, and procedures established by the Corporation.).
This provision does not, however, authorize experimentation with different products, only premiums.
196. H.R. REP. No. 649, supra note 4, at 22, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2521.
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the availability of federal crop insurance. 197 Nonetheless, certain factors
suggest that federal crop insurance is a beneficial use of federal tax
dollars.
At the outset of this article, I proposed that federal crop insurance
should follow certain basic principles governing all types of economic
regulation. Accordingly, in order for any crop insurance proposal to
warrant federal intervention in the market for agricultural risk allocation
services, it must be shown that the private sector, acting alone, cannot
adequately provide that service. Although then-Secretary Bergland
overstated the case in contending that the federal government's place in
the crop insurance market is "unquestionable," three related factors
prevent private forces from entering the market to provide multi-risk
crop insurance absent some form of federal intervention: (1) the non-in-
dependence of agricultural risk; (2) the difficulty of gathering actuarial
data on the interaction of multiple perils; and (3) the overwhelming
fiscal outlay necessary to insure against the loss of crops. Independent-
ly, each of these factors might or might not be sufficient to derail private
efforts to provide crop insurance. Collectively, however, they present
insurmountable hurdles for commercial insurers.
1. The Non-Independence of Crop Loss Risk
The first roadblock inhibiting a wholly private crop insurance
regime is the non-independence of agricultural risk. As discussed above,
agricultural risks are environmental, which distinguishes them from most
other insured risks. 198 A person applying for health insurance, for
example, is typically neither more nor less subject to contract cancer
simply because her neighbor does-unless of course the environment
spawns or transmits the carcinogenic influence, such as the health
hazards posed by Chernobyl.199 Likewise, an auto insurance policy
holder is neither more nor less likely to be involved in a car accident
because he lives next-door to a crazy driver-unless of course his
neighbor crashes into him.
Crop insurance risks are far less independent. When farmer Jane
experiences flooding, there is a strong possibility adjacent farmer Joe
will, too. When farmer Joe loses his crop to fruit flies, it is quite likely
that farmer Jane, who employs similar farming practices in producing
197. USDA, RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINDINGS, supra note 11, at 57.
198. Whereas most federal commodity programs are designed to limit market risk, i.e., price
fluctuations, federal crop insurance is designed to limit the effects of environmental risks. It is
nonetheless difficult to overstate the impact of the weather on market risk.
199. I have chosen cancer because I understand its causes to be related primarily to individual
behavior choices and heredity. By contrast, an epidemic that spreads throughout a community bears
much greater similarity to the nature of agricultural risk.
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the same crop next door, will suffer a similar loss. To cite an empirical
example, consider the effect of Anthonomous grandis, a one-quarter
inch beetle known as the "boll weevil," on cotton farmers in the South
during the early part of this century. The boll weevil is (dis)credited
with having eliminated as many as 55,000 Georgia farms and another
34,000 in South Carolina during the 1920s, 200 and during the preceding
decade that same "pest was probably responsible for more changes in
the number of farms, farm acreage, and farm population than all other
causes put together." 20 1 Stated simply, insects and weather patterns-be
they droughts, floods, hailstorms, or the like-pay no respect to lot lines
or county borders. In consequence, whole regions of the country are
subject to simultaneous crop damage, much as an epidemic sweeping
through a community threatens home after home with sickness. 202
Especially for specialized producers, this means the loss of an entire
season's income. Indeed, for growers of tree and vine crops, a natural
disaster signals "not just the loss of one season's crop, but perhaps three
or four years' income in addition to the cost of tree removal and replace-
ment." 2 0 3 The debilitating impact on the surrounding community is
also disproportionately severe.
The non-independence of agricultural crop losses makes it difficult
for private insurers, particularly small ones, to enter the crop insurance
business profitably. The whole premise of insurance is to spread risk
among a pool of premium payers.204 Yet if the entire pool of premium
payers can potentially file claims simultaneously, the principle of risk
sharing loses its meaning. In the event of a flood of catastrophic pro-
200. 4 U.S. DEP'T oF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, FuEmNTH CENSUS OF THE UNrrED
STATES: 1930 AGRIcuLTURE 12 (1932).
201. Id.
202. For a delightful fictional account of the effect of natural disaster on a farm family and
community, see O.E. ROLVAAO, GIANTS IN THE EARTH 339-50 (1927). For a colorful account of the
effects of the grasshopper on a Minnesota farm family, see LAURA INoALLS WILDER, ON THE BANKS OF
PLUM CREEK 196, 202 (1937)
('The wheat!' Pa shouted. He dashed out the back door and ran toward the wheat-field.
The grasshoppers were eating. You could not hear one grasshopper eat, unless
you listened very carefully while you held him and fed him grass. Millions and millions
of grasshoppers were eating now. You could hear the millions of jaws biting and
chewing.
The whole prairie was changed. The grasses did not wave; they had fallen in
ridges. The rising sun made all the prairie rough with shadows where the tall grasses had
sunk against each other.
The willow trees were bare. In the plum thickets only a few plumpits hung to the
leafless branches. The ripping, clicking, gnawing sound of the grasshoppers' eating was
still going on.).
203. H.R. REP. No. 430, supra note 21, at 10.




portions, for example, a regional commercial insurer might be likened to
a "piggy-bank" whose purpose is solely to save the farmers' money for
a rainy day. By contrast, federalizing certain aspects of the crop insur-
ance business enables national cost-shifting, which mitigates the regional
nature of natural disasters and prevents a run on the local insurance
company.
2. The Difficulty of Gathering Actuarial Data
Second among the barriers to private entry into the crop insurance
market is the difficulty of gathering sufficient actuarial data to forecast
agriculture-related risks. The profitable provision of insurance requires
more than a knowledge of individual farmers' risk propensities, their
competitive advantages, and regional soil qualities; it also requires
substantial data and an understanding of weather patterns and other
environmental risks. This, in turn, requires not only a large capital
outlay, but substantial expertise of a non-financial nature, neither of
which commercial insurers have at their disposal. In theory, nothing is
preventing commercial entities from acquiring such meteorological
expertise-insurance companies routinely develop expertise in other
arcane fields, ranging from complex medical problems to workplace
hazards, prior to entering those markets. Nonetheless, the problem of
limited resources remains. Unlike other sorts of insurance, where risk
related information is more readily available from private sources,
broad-scale data on agricultural risks-especially as those risks relate to
each other-are not sufficiently available absent federal forecasting.
Consequently, a federal role in information gathering is proper. The
USDA currently fulfills that role as to risks about which private compa-
nies lack complete data.205 Insofar as this data, once acquired, remain
current, one may reasonably argue that the justification for federal
involvement diminishes. The tendency of risks, such as insect infestation
to form new, pesticide-resistant strains, for example, suggests an ongoing
federal role is at least somewhat justified.
205. See 7 U.S.C. § 1508(m)(1) (1994) (authorizing "research, surveys, pilot programs, and
investigations relating to crop insurance and agriculture-related risks and losses"); id. § 1508(m)(2)
("No action may be undertaken with respect to a risk under paragraph (1) if insurance protection
against the risk is generally available from private companies."); see also id. § 1506(h) (authorizing
the Corporation to "assemble data for the purpose of establishing sound actuarial bases for insurance
on agricultural commodities"). For a discussion of the related topic of how FCIC price forecasting
could be improved, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CROP INSURANCE: INACCURATE FCIC PRICE
FORECASTS INCREASE PROGRAM COSTS 7-8 (GAO/PEMD-92-4, Dec. 13, 1991).
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3. The Size of Agricultural Risk and Economies of Scale
It might be said that the non-independence of agricultural risk and
the difficulty of gathering sufficient actuarial data are simply necessary
consequences of a third and final factor impeding the success of a
purely private crop insurance regime: the sheer size of agricultural risk
in need of management. Arguably, no commercial insurer could gen-
erate the start-up funds necessary to do business on a large enough scale
to manage this risk profitably. Indeed, even private insurance compa-
nies-which historically have resisted direct federal provision of crop
insurance where privately available-have testified that, "[w]ithout
reinsurance from the Federal Government on supplemental products,
they will not be made available on as wide a scale as is justified or
needed." 206 The current lack of independent private activity in the
multi-peril sector testifies convincingly to the existence of economies of
scale precluding the private provision of such insurance.207
This is not to say there is no role for commercial insurers in the
federal effort to provide disaster assistance. The principles presented at
the outset of this article express a preference for private sector solutions
wherever possible. My comments about the limits of commercial
provision of crop insurance therefore apply only to the sales of
multi-peril coverage. There is no place for federal provision of hail,
lightning, and fire coverage, which "is provided by the private sector in
over 3100 counties in the United States and has been provided for over
65 years."2o8 But to suggest that private forces acting alone can provide
multiple-peril coverage is also inaccurate. 209 In summary, although
policymakers historically have tended to exaggerate the need for gov-
ernment intervention in crop insurance, available information indicates
that there is an appropriate federal role. Accordingly, the following
section attempts to define that role, and the corresponding role that
commercial insurers might serve in providing federal crop insurance.
206. Eg., Reform Proposal, supra note 91, at 305 (statement of John H. Joyce, Chairman, &
Robert W. Post, Jr., Vice Chairman on behalf of the American Association of Crop Insurers).
207. See also supra text accompanying note 18-19.
208. H.R. REP. No. 430, supra note 21, at 68 (dissenting views of Hon. William C. Wampler et
al.). See also Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 383 n.1 (1947) ("[T]he government
engaged in crop insurance as a pioneer. Private insurance companies apparently deemed all-risk crop
insurance too great a commercial hazard.").
209. Indeed, even the present system is built upon the premise that private involvement is neces-
sary, but not sufficient. See Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Federal Crop Ins. Corp., 947 F.2d 269 (7th Cir.
1991) (discussing the role of reinsured companies in federal crop insurance).
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B. DEFINING A JUSTIFIED FEDERAL ROLE IN CROP INSURANCE
According to the principles delineated at the outset of this article,
government action generally is most justified where, due to reasons
beyond the control of society's members acting in private capacities, an
important need is left unprovided for. I have suggested there exists such
a need when a natural disaster destroys the fruit of agricultural labor.
The conclusion that government provision of disaster assistance is
justified generally, however, begs a posterior question: What form
should that intervention take?
In order to answer that question satisfactorily, it is helpful to distin-
guish between two types of reform: particular and systemic. Particular
efforts to reform, which I have defined to mean changes in the types
(and terms) of coverage available to producers, might include phasing in
an area yield concept, 210 eliminating the 20% limit on rate increases, 211
modifying the deficiency payment program to minimize moral haz-
ard, 2 12 or initiating the use of databases, a change implemented as recent-
ly as 1994. Efforts to make particular changes to improve the federal
crop insurance system are to be applauded.
The more important purpose of this article, however, is to examine
proposals for systemic reform, which I have defined to mean fundamen-
tal changes in the means of delivering and ensuring responsive, afford-
able, actuarially-informed crop insurance. Since policy proposals for
systemic reform, like those for particular reform, number as many as do
the problems plaguing federal crop insurance, I propose not to review
such proposals exhaustively, but to discuss two distinct approaches to
reform: (1) the FCIRA, a policy that expresses a preference for crop
insurance by providing inexpensive catastrophic coverage and eliminat-
ing the authority for ad hoc relief; and (2) limiting the federal role to
that of information provider and reinsurer, a policy that expresses a
preference for crop insurance by leaving the private market to develop
210. See 7 U.S.C. § 1508(e)(4) (1994) (permitting "approved insurance providers to offer a plan
of insurance to producers that combines both individual yield coverage and area yield coverage at a
premium rate determined by the provider" under certain conditions); but cf. Jeffrey R. Williams et al.,
Crop Insurance and Disaster Assistance Designs for Wheat and Grain Sorghum, 75 AM. J. AGRIC.
ECON. 435, 445 (1993) (concluding that individual crop insurance is preferable to area crop
insurance).
211. See 7 U.S.C. § 1508(i) (1994) ("The Corporation shall adopt, as soon as practicable, rates
and coverages that will improve the actuarial soundness of the insurance operations of the Corporation
.... except that no rate may be increased by an amount of more than 20 percent over the comparable
rate of the preceding crop year.").
212. See generally Mario J. Miranda & Joseph W. Glauber, Providing Crop Disaster Assistance
Through a Modified Deficiency Payment Program, 73 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1733 (1991); cf. A.W.G.
Farms, Inc. v. Federal Crop Ins. Corp., 757 F.2d 720, 729 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding effectively matching
insurance proceeds with federal price supports).
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and react according to the particular insurance needs of farmers and the
marketing zeal of commercial insurers. While each approach has
advantages and disadvantages discussed below, 213 I shall also focus on
whether they comport with the ideals of justified economic regulation
generally.214
1. Merits and Demerits of the Federal Crop Insurance Reform
Act of 1994
a. FCIRA's Merits
The primary aims of the 1994 federal crop insurance reforms are
the provision of "free" CAT coverage and the elimination of the legal
authority for ad hoc disaster relief, the appeals of which one can hardly
deny. Indeed, the enduring lesson of this country's recent midwestern
flooding, southeastern droughts, and Californian fires may well be that
the most important type of insurance is coverage against the debilitating
effects of the largest disasters. In addition to its intuitive appeal, how-
ever, a primary policy emphasis on CAT coverage accords with sound
economics as well. In economic terms, the marginal utility of each
incremental increase in coverage decreases as the amount of risk insured
increases. The first dollar a farmer receives for his lost crop is therefore
the most valuable, and the rational farming actor is more concerned with
yield losses of 50% than with losses of 10%-a principle embodied in
the use of deductibles. 215 If the FCIRA is problematic, it is certainly not
on account of this emphasis.
213. The environmental externalities of crop insurance are beyond the scope of this article. For
a discussion of how agricultural and environmental objectives generally relate, see American Agricul-
tural Law Association Educational Conference Symposium, 48 OKLA. L. REv. 189 (1995). But cf. Jim
Chen, Get Green or Get Out: Decoupling Environmental from Economic Objectives in Agricultural
Regulation, 48 OKLA. L. REv. 333 (1995).
214. A third policy proposal, and one that received significant attention during the Bush Admini-
stration, is the replacement of the crop insurance program with a permanent disaster assistance fund.
See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE: CURRENT
IssuEs AND OPTIONS FOR REFORM 11 n.4 (Ralph M. Chite) (1992) (noting that permanent disaster
assistance was proposed in 1990). Among the advantages of this approach are simplicity of admini-
stration as compared to the current crop insurance program, which is highly complex. Id. at 11.
Proponents argue that such an approach would save money, but this simply depends on the amount
budgeted for relief. Id. The chief disadvantages of this proposal are its lack of flexibility and, most
importantly, its inequitable nature, as equally deserving farmers possess no guarantee of equal
payments under disaster relief regimes. Id. Conversely, a policy of providing accessible and individu-
alized crop insurance by definition provides coverage commensurate with premiums paid, and limits
government involvement to identifiable percentages. See id. (discussing combination of crop insur-
ance and disaster payments).
215. But cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLtJM. L. REv. 903,914 (1996)
(arguing that decisions such as whether to purchase insurance are less a function of rationality than of




A second and related advantage of the FCIRA is its probable effect
on participation. Indeed, even as modified by the 1996 Farm Bill, the
1994 Act offers three enticements for producers to purchase crop
insurance. The first is simply the cost of enrollment, as it is hard to
imagine why a farmer would choose self-insurance on half of her crop
when she could insure it at 60% of expected market value for "free" (a
nominal $50 filing fee).
In addition, however, the FCIRA dispenses with the legal authority
for ad hoc disaster relief. One might argue that putting hope in such a
provision is premature given today's political climate; a natural disaster
of catastrophic proportions might cause Congress to repeal its repeal.
Still, that Congress demonstrated a willingness to bind itself in this regard
is at least somewhat encouraging. Although only a small percentage of
farmers cite the availability of disaster relief as a principal reason for
declining to participate in federal crop insurance, the FCIRA makes an
important policy statement that planning through risk management is
preferable to unpredictable, and therefore inequitable, "band-aid"
relief. The importance of this message should not be underestimated,
since, as discussed above, the provision of both ad hoc relief and crop
insurance not only is counterproductive in practice, but as a matter of
principle suggests to farmers that crop insurance is not something about
which the government is serious. Furthermore, the perception among
farmers that Congress is serious about making crop insurance the
exclusive form of agricultural disaster assistance might lessen the politi-
cal pressure for an ad hoc measure, while providing a needed justifica-
tion for legislators responding to any remaining pressure by reminding
farmers that they assumed the risk of self-insurance. Stated simply, the
elimination of the authority for ad hoc disaster relief is one of the most
plainly admirable stipulations of the FCIRA.
A third and powerful means by which the FCIRA seeks to increase
participation in crop insurance is through the "linkage" of crop insur-
ance enrollment with eligibility for other agricultural assistance. While
the FCIRA made the purchase of CAT coverage a "mandatory" condi-
tion of farm program participation, the 1996 Farm Bill wisely tempered
this provision to permit farmers to qualify by waiving in writing their
eligibility for future disaster relief. The 1996 Farm Bill provision
represents an improvement simply because it recognizes the importance
of retaining self-insurance as a viable option for some farmers. Many
producers can and do manage risk effectively through savings and
diversification, without government assistance. These efforts should be
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praised. Farmers should not, however, be "free" to self-insure if self-
insuring also means receiving disaster relief at the taxpayer's expense.216
The contingency requirement has the added advantage of aligning
crop protection with the terms of other insurance. Just as banks regular-
ly require the purchase of home insurance to protect their investment as
mortgagee, and just as agricultural banks condition eligibility for operat-
ing loans on the purchase of crop insurance, 217 so should Congress
protect its investment of tax dollars.218
The FCIRA thus contains three provisions that hold significant
promise for increasing participation in federal crop insurance. Although
data on the effects of the 1996 Farm Bill's retreat from mandatory
linkage are not yet available, roughly 80% of eligible producers pur-
chased crop insurance in 1995.219 Fifteen years after enactment of the
FCIA of 1980, the FCIRA is finally beginning to achieve Congress's
goal of widespread participation in federal crop insurance.
One might nonetheless respond that these benefits are not without
their costs. For example, the USDA has projected that the FCIRA will
cost approximately $8.1 billion for Fiscal Years 1995-1999 (which is
more than current FCIC measures), but that the net effect will be savings
of $750 million over the next five years due to offsets in money not
spent on ad hoc disaster relief.220 Thereafter, USDA projects that the
FCIRA's cost will be equivalent to the cost of current programs. 221 A
savings of $750 million might itself justify reform. The FCIRA's
long-run costs, however, are projected to equal those of current pro-
grams. Nearly the entire justification for eliminating disaster relief is
budgetary, so if neither alternative promises savings in the long run, one
could argue that eliminating the crop insurance program, not disaster
216. See generally RuFFiN & GREGORY, supra note 13, at 878 (defining "free rider" as "anyone
who enjoys the benefits of a good or service without paying the cost").
217. See generally Reform Proposal, supra note 92, at 237-39 (statement of James F. Hart, Presi-
dent & CEO, Hand County State Bank, Miller, South Dakota, on Behalf of the Independent Bankers
Association of America).
218. Subject to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, the principle that the government may
"regulate that which it subsidizes" is well settled. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 131 (1942) (find-
ing that the federal government may regulate even on-farm use of wheat under Commerce Clause
where farmer participates in acreage allotment program). Cf., e.g., Rosenberger v. University of
Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995) (finding state university's denial of funding to publication espousing
religious viewpoint is subject to the free speech clause).
219. See Fiscal Year 1997 Agriculture and Related Agencies Appropriations: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Agriculture, Rural Development, and Related Agencies of the Senate Appropriations
Comm., 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) available in WESTLAW, 1996 WL 228881 [hereinafter 1997
Senate Appropriations] (statement of Eugene Moos, Under Secretary, Farm and Foreign Agricultural
Services, USDA).
220. Reform Proposal, supra note 91, at 41-42 (statement of Eugene Moos, Under Secretary,
International Affairs and Commodity Programs, USDA & Kenneth D. Ackerman, Manager, FCIC).
221. Id. at 42.
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relief, would save an equivalent amount in administrative costs. If the
financial savings turn out to be a wash, would not prudence counsel for
maintaining the status quo?
The answer to this question is "no," but primarily for nonfinancial
reasons. That is, a third significant advantage of the FCIRA over previ-
ous policy is that crop insurance is simply more equitable than ad hoc
disaster relief. Producers left to depend primarily on ad hoc relief have
no way of knowing in advance whether Congress will bail them out. Yet
even assuming, arguendo, they could predict that aid would be forth-
coming, that aid would most certainly not be fairly distributed. Consid-
er, for instance, the disparity between the aid given to victims of 1992's
Hurricane Andrew and that given to victims of the 1993 midwestern
floods: while Florida agriculturists were reimbursed at a rate of 50.04%
of their losses, Midwesterners were "indemnified" for no less than
100% of theirs. 222 Similarly, farmers facing tremendous losses, but in
states not located in targeted regions, "found that congressional deci-
sions affecting their livelihoods were being based upon factors totally
unconnected to their circumstances." 223 In short, ad hoc disaster relief
is anything but predictable for either farmers or those footing the bill.
Crop insurance, in contrast, protects those who purchase coverage to an
extent commensurate with the premiums they pay. Can it seriously be
contended that "hit or miss" relief is preferable to crop insurance? 224
b. FCIRA's Demerits
The FCIRA's principal weakness lies in its retention of a dual
delivery system. 225 Although the literal terms of the FCIRA authorized
delivery of CAT coverage by either reinsured companies or, "at the
option of the Secretary that is based on considerations of need," 2 26 by
the USDA, the Secretary interpreted the Act as a mandate to provide
CAT coverage directly.227 The FCIRA authorizes the provision of
buy-up coverage on only slightly different terms: producers must apply
to reinsured companies to purchase such coverage, and only "[i]f
additional coverage is unavailable privately" may the FCIC provide it
222. Review of the Administration's Federal Crop Insurance Reform Proposal: Joint Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Env't, Credit, and Rural Dev. and the Subcomm. on Specialty Crops and
Natural Resources of the Comm. on Agric. House of Representatives, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1994)
(statement of Kenneth Ackerman, Manager, FCIC).
223. Id.
224. See 140 CONG. Rc. S1,264 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1994) (statement of Senator Durenburger)
("Insurance is often the fairer way of allocating costs. The problem is getting the people at risk to
subscribe so long as they have good reason to think the government will bail them out anyway.").
225. 7 U.S.C. § 1508(b)(4) (1994); id. § 1508(c)(B).
226. 7 U.S.C. § 1508(b)(4)(ii).
227. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
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directly.228 One might justifiably wonder whether there is a substantive
difference between these two provisions: each provides for direct gov-
ernmental delivery, but only if the Secretary determines that there is a
need. Notwithstanding the nominal differences in their texts, however,
the Secretary has interpreted only the buy-up provision to suggest that
direct delivery is unnecessary.229
While the 1996 Farm Bill purports to move a step closer to
single-point delivery, its terms leave ample room for doubt. The lan-
guage of the Farm Bill merely provides that, to the extent CAT coverage
is "sufficiently available . . . as determined by the Secretary," only
private insurance entities may provide it.230 Conversely, "if the Secre-
tary determines that there is an insufficient number of approved insur-
ance providers," he "may continue to offer catastrophic risk protec-
tion." 23 1 Perhaps those trained in the nuances of legal hermeneutics
appreciate the fine distinctions between these provisions and previous
law, which permitted government delivery in cases where the Secretary
determined that there existed a "need." And perhaps Secretary of
Agriculture Daniel Glickman will perceive Congress as having given him
a mandate to interpret "sufficiently available" broadly.
2 32 Still, it is
hard to resist the conclusion that Congress simply lacks the political will
to remove the delivery of federal crop insurance from the control of
USDA. During the debate that led to the 1994 reforms, FCIC Manager
Kenneth Ackerman testified that farmers elected reinsured coverage at a
rate expected to reach 100% by the end of 1994.233 Nevertheless, the
Clinton Administration advocated, and Congress retained, dual delivery.
Even applying the most charitable principles of statutory interpretation,
it would be better entirely to do away with government delivery.
The abolition of direct USDA delivery of crop insurance would
have several advantages. First and foremost, private companies have a
far greater incentive to develop innovative policies that are responsive to
the needs of farmers. Whereas the maintenance of direct delivery
228. 7 U.S.C. § 1508(c)(1)(B).
229. See FARM SERVICE AGENCY, supra note 130 (recording no government sales of additional
coverage).
230. § 193, 110 Stat. 888, 943 (1996) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1508(c)(ii)).
231. Id. (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1508(c)(i)).
232. If Secretary Glickman were to choose to maintain the present policy of direct delivery,
Congress would probably have to remove his statutory discretion to reverse his decision. See Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984) (reviewing court
must accept agency's "reasonable" interpretations of gap or ambiguity in statute the agency is
charged with administering). Compare Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpre-
tations of Law, 1989 DuKE LJ. 511,516-17 (defending Chevron) with Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review
of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 377 (1986) (criticizing Chevron).




requires substantial fixed-cost expenditures for the maintenance of FCIC
offices-without regard to their performance-reimbursements of
commercial insurers-if properly managed by well-negotiated standard
reinsurance agreements-are commensurate with the degree of risk they
assume and limited to the number of sales they produce. Given appro-
priate government backing through reinsurance, recent testimony before
Congress indicates that granting reinsured companies a greater degree of
latitude to innovate would result in an "explosion of crop insurance
products ."234
One example of such an innovation is a product known as a disap-
pearing deductible.235 This type of endorsement would increase farm-
ers' indemnity per bushel as their losses increased, to the point that a
total crop failure would result in a 100% indemnity, at potential savings
for the government and a reasonable premium-one lower than the
current rate for 85% coverage-for farmers. 236 At present, commercial
entities lack both the authority and the incentive to develop such prod-
ucts, as current coverage tops out at 85% and the FCIC bears the responsi-
bility for the generation of new products. Yet the primary reason for
non-enrollment is a lack of coverage both sufficient and flexible enough
to justify the premium. 237 A policy that eliminates the government's
role as deliverer and product designer holds the potential to eliminate
this incongruity.
Apart from their incentive to create affordable and effective prod-
ucts, commercial insurers also possess greater knowledge of both the
needs of their constituent communities and insurance products generally,
which naturally enables them to provide better service. A related and
somewhat frequent criticism of government delivery offices, by con-
trast-even among advocates of dual delivery-is that public employees
lack sufficient training and incentive to understand the complexities of
federal crop insurance and to provide complete counseling. 238 This
234. Reform Proposal, supra note 91, at 305 (statement of John H. Joyce, Chairman, & Robert W.
Post, Jr., Vice Chairman, on behalf of the American Association of Crop Insurers). Ackerman testi-
fied that reinsured coverage was expected to reach 100 percent by the end of 1994. Yet the FCIRA
retained a dual delivery system.
235. Id.
236. Id.; see also id. at 239 (testimony of James F. Hart, President & CEO, Hand County State
Bank, Miller, South Dakota, on Behalf of the Independent Bankers Association of America) (discuss-
ing disappearing deductibles).
237. See supra notes 193-97 and accompanying text.
238. See generally Fiscal Year 1997 Agriculture and Related Agencies Appropriations: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Agric., Rural Dev., and Related Agencies of the House Appropriations
Comm., 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996), available in WESTLAW, 1996 WL 188769 [hereinafter 1997
House Appropriations] (statement of Katherine Ozer, Director, National Family Farm Coalition);
Reform Proposal, supra note 92, at 238 (testimony of James F. Hart, President & CEO, Hand County
State Bank, Miller, South Dakota, on Behalf of the Independent Bankers Association of America).
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problem has been exacerbated by the fact that, while CAT coverage has
been delivered primarily through USDA offices, buy-up coverage has
been delivered mainly by commercial entities. While private insurers'
livelihood depends upon their competent delivery of both types of
coverage, USDA employees, often overburdened with the administration
of several other farm programs, possess "neither the expertise nor the
incentive to deliver these products in an efficient, conscientious man-
ner."239 This is not the fault of individual USDA employees, of course,
but of the system as a whole. In some instances USDA employees admit
a lack of understanding of the program's nuances and refer producers
to independent agents. 240 Other times, however, misinformation or
otherwise inadequate guidance inhibits more extensive participation in
the buy-up portion of the program. Moreover, since actuarial soundness
depends largely upon the effective solicitation of buy-up coverage (as
opposed to "free" CAT coverage, which is simply a more predictable
substitute for ad hoc relief), dual delivery ultimately hinders the fiscal
soundness of federal crop insurance. Indeed, one of the primary disad-
vantages of the FCIRA is its failure to achieve actuarial soundness. 24 1
This is attributable in part to the system's failure to create an incentive to
align risk with premiums-an incentive built in to the system when
private entities are entitled to determine rates and forms of coverage.
That said, however, the lack of actuarial soundness is also attributable to
the effects of dual delivery on participation in additional coverage. And,
although one could argue that private delivery is relatively unprofitable
where the coverage is free, fostering private delivery of the free coverage
would give reinsured companies an opportunity to market and increase
sales of buy-up coverage.
Most importantly, however, a system of exclusive private delivery
would help align federal crop insurance with other forms of economic
regulation and government contracting.2 42  The delivery of insur-
ance-from the sales and service to the processing of data and claims-is
traditionally a private sector function. 243 The infrastructure necessary to
239. 1997 House Appropriations, supra note 238 (statement of Katherine Ozer, Director,
National Family Farm Coalition).
240. 1995 Risk Management Hearings, supra note 100, at 103-04 (statement of Sharon K.
Heaton, Vice President, National Association of Professional Insurance Agents).
241. See GAO, ADDmONAL ACrIONS, supra note 109.
242. Agricultural policy generally, in keeping with its mandate to protect the original "discrete
and insular minorit[y],' United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), tends not to
conform to the ideals of economic regulation generally, but more closely adheres to the ideals of
special interest legislation. See Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 Sup. Cr.
REV. 397,404-06 (detailing "[t]he politics of filled milk" and the Filled Milk Act at issue in the case).
243. Cf. Office of Management & Budget, Circular A-76 OMB (Revised) (1983); see also Office
of Management & Budget Policy Letter on Inherently Governmental Functions, 57 Fed. Reg.
45,096-103 (Sept. 30, 1992) (clarifying OMB circular A-76).
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deliver federal crop insurance is in place across the country, and eliminat-
ing USDA delivery could be expected to result in substantial savings in
fixed costs and paperwork, since federal appropriations would be limited
to those necessary to support contracting with reinsured companies and
engaging in forecasting research. Even assuming these savings were
only modest, simplicity is preferable where feasible, ceteris paribus,
especially in an era of reinvented government.
Critics might rejoin, as well they should, that single-point delivery
would benefit only private insurers,2 44 given the disproportionate benefit
current FCIC management has already delivered to private firms in
recent years. Even granting-as past experience suggests-that this is a
genuine concern, the solution is not to limit private involvement in the
program. Rather, the FCIC might continue to modify its standard
reinsurance agreements to ensure that private companies share a pro-
portion of risk commensurate with their potential for profit. 245 Govern-
ment contracting generally is premised on the notion that arms-length
bargaining and competitive bidding produces a reasonably efficient
provision of services, and there is no reason to think the provision of
crop insurance is uniquely prone to inefficiencies or bargaining difficul-
ties. Furthermore, it is hard to deny that producers stand much to gain
from greater coverage flexibility, particularly given the fact that low
participation in the current system is due in large part to the absence of
coverage sufficient to justify the premiums charged. 246
2. Government as Facilitator
The FCIRA took a step in the right direction. In emphasizing the
importance of a base level of crop protection, providing strong incen-
tives for increased participation, and eliminating the "hit or miss"
tendencies of ad hoc relief, the 1994 reforms made three beneficial
changes. Unfortunately, however, the FCIRA left in place certain other
provisions of previous law that desperately needed reform. Most impor-
tantly, while the FCIRA wisely shifted the emphasis of federal disaster
assistance from ad hoc relief to crop insurance, it did little to make the
system of providing crop insurance more responsive to producers'
shifting needs. 247 Rather, the FCIRA retained a system of dual delivery
244. See CHEN, supra note 154, at 320.
245. The FCIC has already begun to make efforts in this regard. See 1997 Senate Appropria-
tions, supra note 219, at 4 (statement of Eugene Moos, Under Secretary, Farm and Foreign Agricultur-
al Services, USDA) (noting that "reimbursements to private companies for delivery expenses will be
limited to 29 percent of premiums").
246. See supra notes 193-97 and accompanying text.
247. This is not a rejection of CAT coverage per se, but a rejection of CAT coverage as an end
unto itself. Congress might adopt a fundamentally more responsive system while encouraging deliver
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and left the primary responsibility for innovative coverage designs on
the shoulders of a governmental entity with little incentive and insuffi-
cient training to make crop insurance "farmer-friendly." It follows,
from what I have argued, that the federal role in crop insurance is more
narrow than Congress has thus far recognized. Limiting the govern-
ment's role to efforts to facilitate a private crop insurance regime would
better achieve federal crop insurance's objectives of actuarial soundness.
Implementing a program of government as facilitator would pri-
marily entail two changes from current policy: first, eliminating direct
delivery in favor of a system of exclusive private delivery by reinsured
companies, while maintaining a federal role as reinsurer for multi-peril
policies; and second, retaining federal responsibility for information
gathering, distribution, and forecasting. Like the FCIRA, such a policy
would necessarily eliminate the authority for all ad hoc disaster relief.
Since I have already discussed the need to eliminate dual delivery in Part
IV.B.1 and the need for federal provision of reinsurance and informa-
tion provision in Part IV.A., the following section will focus on the value
of a system of government as facilitator according to the principles of
justified intervention set forth in Part I.
In addition to the advantages of encouraging innovation, efficiency,
and maximum flexibility, a federal role in crop insurance, in the capacity
of reinsurer and forecaster, also withstands scrutiny under principles
governing economic regulation generally. As I have noted, government
market intervention is most justified to provide a public good in cases of
market failure. Relatedly, where a need is left unprovided for as a result
of factors within an individual's control, the state is unjustified in inter-
vening. Naturally, these principles apply not only to the threshold issue
of whether the government should enter a market, but also to the posteri-
or issue of the extent to which it should intervene. It follows that forms
of government involvement that effectively utilize private actors are
preferable to those that fail to do so.
Federal assistance in providing affordable and accessible crop
insurance is therefore appropriate. The debilitating effects of natural
phenomena are not factors over which producers have control and,
absent federal intervention in the form of reinsurance and data collec-
tion, farmers would remain largely unable to protect themselves against
such disasters. By the same token, however, the provision of crop
insurance also eliminates the justification for ad hoc disaster relief, as
there is an inverse relationship between the extent that producers are
ers to promote CAT coverage. Nor have I characterized the FCIRA as particular in an overall sense,
as certain provisions of the 1994 Act, viz. the elimination of the authority for ad hoc disaster relief,
have a comprehensive flavor.
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eligible for crop insurance and the justification for other forms of
assistance. Ad hoc relief has no place in a universal crop insurance
program, for "[a] natural disaster is no excuse for a fiscal disaster." 248
Critics of such a narrow federal role might argue that it would
increase premiums,249 in turn decreasing participation and increasing the
pressure for ad hoc relief. This criticism has merit insofar as actuarial
soundness is dependent upon participation and, to be sure, the two are
closely related. Yet the present system emphasizes participation at the
expense of profitability and realistic rate setting, which also are closely
related to actuarial soundness. Relatedly, consider the implications of
this claim under the criteria set forth in Part I.
First, it is important to remember that commercial insurers do have
an incentive to provide crop insurance at rates agreeable to farmers. 250
Given the absence of substantial barriers to entry into the insurance
market, the presence of price competition can be expected not only to
generate a variety of innovative products, but to serve as a check against
excessive rates. Second, one must consider rate levels not in the abstract,
but relative to rates established through a system of direct government
delivery. An increase in the cost of insurance does not compel the
conclusion that the program is less efficient or more costly overall, but
rather that the price now reflects the true cost of insurance-the amount
the market will bear.251 Finally, this criticism might simply be character-
ized as a question of the proper level of subsidization. Higher rates are
not, in and of themselves, a sufficient basis for rejecting reinsured
delivery of crop insurance, for the government may still subsidize
premiums either directly or through other methods.252
From the perspective of the principles governing the validity of
economic regulation generally, the government is only required to
248. 140 CONG. Rac. S1265 (daily ed., Feb. 9, 1994) (statement of Sen. Durenburger).
249. See, e.g., Elrifi, supra note 149 (comparing crop insurance in the United States and
Canada).
250. Recall, for example, how resistant farmers are to premiums, even when subsidized, as
discussed in Part 1Il, supra. For a discussion of the lengths to which private actors generally are will-
ing to go to compete, see ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTmusT PARADox: A POLICY AT WAR wrrH ITSELF
144-48 (1978), Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REv.
263 (1981), and Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
251. See generally PosNER, supra note 177.
252. Although a full discussion of crop insurance subsidization is beyond the scope of this article,
I note that the perceived fairness of the federal crop insurance system depends in part upon its success
in providing accessible and affordable insurance. Although I take no position on whether Congress
should subsidize the purchase of crop insurance, it may be the case that some subsidization is neces-
sary to achieve desired levels of affordability. To that extent, subsidization is not incompatible with
my proposal. In a system of maximum private participation, however, commercial insurers possess an
incentive to increase enrollment, and the government can reasonably expect to get better mileage
from its subsidies. In a properly functioning system there should be a direct and sensitive relation
between subsidization and desired participation.
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provide accessible and affordable insurance. Participation may be an
indirect measure of the fairness of the system, but only to the extent that
it reflects the program's affordability. Theoretically, the government
could provide an affordable system of crop insurance, and many might
choose not to enroll. Lack of enrollment, however, does not make the
government's provision of insurance inequitable. So long as the system
is reasonably affordable, the government has fulfilled its role and is
under no obligation to provide further relief.
V. CONCLUSION
During the congressional debate that led to the enactment of the
Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980, several members of the House
Agriculture Committee dissented from the Committee Report's recom-
mendation that the Act be adopted.253 Their stated objection was that the
Act, as written, threatened to interfere with private efforts to provide
certain forms of crop insurance coverage. In support, they marshaled
the wisdom of President Abraham Lincoln, who once said of government
intervention:
The legitimate object of government is to do for a community
of people what they need to have done, but cannot do at all, or
cannot so well do, for themselves, in their separate and individ-
ual capacities. In all that the people can individually do as
well for themselves, government ought not to interfere.254
Significantly, Lincoln did not say that government should do for
the people what they can but fail to do for themselves. Despite the
passage of more than 130 years, President Lincoln's statement provides
a helpful perspective on issues of economic regulation generally, and on
crop insurance in particular.
Barring a prophetic influence on the weather, 255 agricultural pro-
ducers cannot adequately insure themselves against the risks of crop
failure without some form of governmental assistance-at least, that is,
until agriculture has become so utterly concentrated that all producers
are large enough to self insure. 256 Until that day arrives, however, it is
appropriate to ask whether, and how, the government should intervene to
protect them. I have argued that the role best assumed by the federal
253. HR. REI. No. 430, supra note 21, at 67-74 (dissenting views of Rep. Bill Wampler et al.).
254. Id. at 68.
255. 1 Kings 18:41-46.
256. Several agricultural corporations and cooperatives number among the Fortune 500. As of
1996, they included: Philip Morris (10), ConAgra (26), Sara Lee (50), Archer Daniels Midland (92),
General Mills (156), Farmland Industries (178), Ralston Purina (180). The Fortune 500 Largest US.
Corporations, FORTUNE, April 29, 1996, at Fl, FI-F20.
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government is one that facilitates a private regime of crop insurance. If I
am correct in arguing that government intervention is legitimate where it
serves to protect interests left otherwise unprotected by the market, the
federal government is completely justified in serving the roles of reinsur-
er and forecaster. By the same token, there is no justification for govern-
mental provisions of disaster relief to farmers who could have purchased
insurance, provided that insurance meets minimum requirements of
accessibility and affordability.
Despite its imperfections, a federally chartered but privately-held
regime like that employed in the lending context represents the best
available means of ensuring that farmers can opt to protect them-
selves.257 Should producers opt for self-insurance or another form of
risk assumption, Congress is under no obligation, moral or otherwise, to
come to their aid. Should they opt for participation in the federal
scheme, the program will have achieved a large part of its objective.
257. Cf. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2279 (1994) (chartering the privately-owned Farm Credit System).
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